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INTRODUCTION 
Wade McCree was the thirty-sixth Solicitor General of the United States, 
serving from 1977 to 1981. This Article examines his tenure as Solicitor 
General (SG). It begins with background material, in Part I on McCree 
himself, and in Part II on the political and legal context in which he operated. 
In Part III, McCree's performance as Solicitor General is analyzed, using 
statistics and a series of cases to illuminate the ways in which McCree dealt 
with the major issues facing modem Solicitors General. 
McCree was indisputably one of the greatest legal minds of his day. 
Unfortunately, his contributions have been under-appreciated. An additional 
purpose of this Article is to remedy that neglect, and give proper attention and 
credit to this giant of Michigan legal history. 
I. BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Wade Hampton McCree, Jr., was born on July 3, 1920, in Des Moines, 
Iowa, the second of four children. 1 His father was a pharmacist and became 
a federal narcotics inspector, a job which took the McCree family to Hawaii, 
Chicago, and Boston.2 McCree graduated from the famous Boston Latin 
School and attended Nashville's Fisk University, his parents' alma mater, 
from which he graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa in 1941.3 He 
then began studies at Harvard Law School, but World War II intervened and 
McCree was inducted into the U.S. Army.4 He spent four years on active 
duty, including two years in combat. 5 There, he rose to the rank of Captain 
and earned a Bronze Star.6 
Returning to civilian life, McCree married Dores McCrary in 1946. He 
graduated from Harvard in 1948, but was given a degree, nunc pro tunc, as a 
I. Except where otherwise noted, the information in this Part can be found in 
Presentation of the Portrait of the Honorable Wade McCree, Cincinnati, Ohio (June II, 1981), 
reprinted in 725 F.2d XCVII (6th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Portrait Presentation]. 
2. See Marcus D. Williams, Lawyer, Judge, Solicitor General, Educator: A Tribute 
to Wade H. McCree, Jr., 12 NAT'L BLACK L.J. I, I (1990) (citing WASH. POST, Sept. I, 1997, 
at B4). 
3. See id. (citing Edward J. Littlejohn & Donald L. Hobson, Black Lawyers, Law 
Review, and Bar Associations-1844 to 1970: A Michigan History, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1625, 
1644 (1987)). 
4. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See Jerrold K. Footlick & Diane Camper, Uncle Sam's Lawyer, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 
5,1977, at 97. 
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member of the class of 1944, in which he ranked twelfth.7 The McCrees 
moved to Detroit, where Wade entered private practice. 
Not long after, in 1952, McCree's skills were recognized by Michigan 
Governor G. Mennen Williams, who appointed McCree to the state's 
Workers' Compensation Commission.s Two years later, Williams gave 
McCree an appointment as a trial judge on the Wayne County Circuit Court, 
a move which raised some eyebrows and seemed politically risky for the 
governor, given McCree's race.9 The next year, McCree won a retention 
election, surprising more than a few observers, and making him Michigan's 
first elected black judge. 10 His barrier-breaking rise through the ranks of the 
judiciary continued, first with his appointment to the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in 1961, and then with his elevation 
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1966. 
In his decades on the bench, McCree was known as a careful craftsman 
of opinions and a master wordsmith, "often taking hours to make sure that the 
language was perfect.,,11 While he strongly favored protecting individual 
rights against encroachment from the government, and had a pro-civil rights 
record on issues such as defendants' rights and busing, "he would never bend 
the law.,,12 Indeed, he was generally classified as a "lawyer, not a civil rights 
activist.,,13 Most of all, he was known for "practicing a rigorous self-
discipline" to be objective, both personally and jurisprudentially .14 In other 
words, he possessed an eminently judicial temperament, a characteristic which 
was to serve him well as Solicitor General. 
An example of McCree's commitment to fairness appears in a story he 
often retold, about a racist lawyer he faced when he was a trial judge. The 
opposing party was black, and so the lawyer demanded that McCree recuse 
himself. This request deeply angered McCree, who resented the implication 
that blacks, but not whites, were incapable of making decisions uninfluenced 
7. See Williams, supra note 2, at 2. 
8. See id. 
9. See G. Mennen Williams, Wade McCree's Michigan Legacy, 86 MICH. L. REv. 257 
(1987). 
10. See id. 
II. Horace W. Gilmore, Wade H. McCree, Jr.: A Compassionate and Great Judge, 86 
MICH. L. REv. 231,233 (1987) (reviewing McCree's jurisprudence). 
12. [d. 
13. Uncle Sam's Attorney, TIME, Oct. 23, 1978, at 109. 
14. Pierce Lively, Wade H. McCree, Jr.: Born to Be a Judge, 86 MICH. L. REv. 249, 
250 (1987) ("His colleagues and friends did not only admire his objectivity; they were amazed 
and frequently put to shame by it. "). Of course, not all of his acquaintances were as forgiving 
when, as Solicitor General, McCree adopted even-handed legal positions that put him at odds 
with their liberal policy preferences. 
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by race. He half-seriously agreed to recuse himself on the condition that he 
be replaced by a judge of mixed race. IS 
McCree was personally committed to civil rights, to be sure, but he was 
committed foremost to the pursuit of excellence. Coming of age in an era of 
intense discrimination, 16 McCree was of the firm be lief that he could not count 
on getting any breaks; racial politics rarely if ever worked to the advantage of 
a black man in his day. 17 He served the cause of civil rights by doing his jobs 
well 18 and by being an outstanding role model,19 as well as through specific 
participation in the movement.20 No agitator, his strategy was to keep his head 
15. This story is retold in several sources. See, e.g., Footlick & Camper, supra note 6, 
at 97; William K. Stevens, Solicitor General-Designate, Wade Hampton McCree Jr., N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1977, at A14. 
16. As there would surely be for anyone in his position during those years, there are 
innumerable stories of the indignities McCree faced as a black man, and the calm reserve with 
which he handled them. Two appeared in a newspaper article written soon after his appointment 
as SG and suffice as examples. See Two Turning Points Help Chart Wade McCree's Judicial 
Career, TOL. BLADE, Jan. 23,1977. 
After graduating from high school, McCree had initially planned to attend the University 
of Iowa, where, as an Iowan, he would not have to pay tuition. Unfortunately, he was denied 
ajob in a university dormitory because of his skin color. When it was suggested that he could 
find boarding with a "fine colored lady" in town who had taken other black students as boarders 
before, McCree reconsidered, and decided to go instead to the more hospitable Fisk. See id. 
After McCree's graduation from law school, the Harvard Law School placement office 
arranged an interview for him with a prestigious Detroit firm. When he showed up with the 
invitation the firm had sent him, McCree recounted, the receptionist looked at him as if she 
thought that '''at best [he) had found the letter, and that at worst [he] had stolen it.'" Stevens, 
supra note 15, at A14. After being kept waiting a long time, McCree was ushered into the office 
of a senior partner, who apologized for the delay. The partner had been trying to find "a colored 
law firm" that might be able to help McCree, since there was no way he could work at the white 
firm. McCree refused the offer of assistance and affiliated with the firm of Bledsoe and Taylor, 
two of Detroit's pioneering black lawyers. See Williams, supra note 2, at 2. 
17. This characterization of McCree's belief was made by Professor (and former SG) 
Drew Days, in an interview at Yale Law School on May 5, 1997, and is amply supported by my 
research. 
18. Answering a questionnaire sent to him about black leadership many years later, 
McCree listed obtaining his three judicial posts as his "most outstanding accomplishments as 
a leader." He attributed his success to, respectively, being qualified, having political support, 
and being lucky. Questionnaire from Wade McCree (Wade McCree Papers, Box 68) (on file 
with Walter Reuther Library at Wayne State University) [hereinafter McCree Papers]. 
19. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Wade H McCree, Jr.: A Model o/Excellence, 86 
MICH. L. REv. 227 (\ 987); Otis M. Smith, The Quintessential Public Servant, 86 MICH. L. REv. 
255 (1987). 
20. Among other things, McCree worked as a research attorney on the Brown v. Board 
o/Education project while he was a workers' compensation referee. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., 
Family Photo Captures a Key Time in History o/Civil Rights Struggle, OET. FREE PRESS, Feb. 
25, 1993, at 80 ("My father viewed his small contribution to the Brown v. Board brief as a labor 
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down, work harder, achieve better results, and be resigned to inevitable 
skepticism. Even as racial conditions improved, sympathetic articles still felt 
the need to point out immediately that he was black.21 
McCree's quiet, hardworking nature contrasted with a friendly, jovial 
side to his personality. On the one hand, he was something of a quiet loner 
within the vibrant black community in Detro it. 22 On the other hand, he was 
legendary for his personal kindness, impressive memory bank, and storytelling 
ability. The New York Times described him upon his appointment: 
Although he is loquacious and discursive in conversation, he is known as something 
of a calm, reserved loner. It has been suggested that this is natural for a man who has 
had to keep control of himself during a lifetime of scrutiny by those who are 
suspicious of barrier-breakers.23 
McCree was also known as the '''poet laureate of the Sixth Circuit,"'24 
a reference both to the command of language evidenced in his opinions, and 
to his impressive facility for writing impromptu limericks, which he used to 
break "the tension at combative ... conferences.,,25 One would not exaggerate 
to say that he was beloved by those who worked with him, and that he was one 
of, ifnot the most, distinguished judges on the Sixth Circuit.26 He served on 
the Sixth Circuit for over ten years, until his appointment as SG in 1977, and 
was called "Judge" for the rest of his (non-judicial) career. McCree recounted 
that accepting the post of SG was difficult, meaning as it did a reduction in 
salary and the sacrifice of his lifetime judicial appointment.27 He seems, 
oflove."). Id. 
21. See, e.g., Uncle Sam's Attorney, supra note 13, at 109 (introducing McCree as "a 
gentle-looking black lawyer"). The New York Times made McCree's race the focus of its 
article about him after his nomination. See Stevens, supra note 15, at A14. While McCree's 
race was no doubt an important aspect of his life, it was far from the most significant thing about 
his work as a circuit court judge or SG. 
22. See Austin Scott, Bel/'s Solicitor General-Designate is a Precedent Setter, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 2, 1977, at 02. 
23. Stevens, supra note 15, at A14. 
24. Footlick & Camper, supra note 6, at 97. 
25. Remer Tyson, Acquaintances Remember Wade McCree as Trailblazer, DET. FREE 
PRESS, Sep. 4, 1987, at 14A (citing then-Chief Judge of the Sixth Circuit Pierce Lively and 
Deputy SG Larry Wallace). 
26. It is easy to marshal evidence for this proposition, including, somewhat sadly, the 
outpouring of tributes, honors, scholarships, endowments, and memorials that followed 
McCree's premature death in 1987. A concentrated source appears in the November, 1987 issue 
of the Michigan Law Review, in which ten touching tributes appear. Fond memories of McCree 
still abound, and a current Sixth Circuit judge notes that "Wade McCree['s] ... legacy is still 
around the court here.·' E-mail from Judge Danny J. Boggs to author, Feb. 6, 1997. 
27. See Gilmore, supra note II, at 243 n.41; Uncle Sam's Attorney, supra note 13, at 
109. 
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though, to have relished the challenge of the job of SG,28 and to have felt a 
patriotic duty to serve,29 and while he clearly loved being a judge, there is 
some evidence that he was ready for a change.3o 
After ending his service as SG in 1981, McCree refused numerous offers 
of employment from prestigious law firms (including many that would never 
have considered even interviewing him thirty-three years earlier) and decided 
to teach at the University of Michigan Law Schoo!.3l While a professor, he 
served three times as a Special Master for the United States Supreme Court.32 
It is unclear if McCree had an offer to return to the federal bench,33 or if he 
would have accepted such an offer, though it is reported that he did decline the 
chance to serve on the Michigan Supreme Court.34 
On August 30, 1987, McCree died of a heart attack, a complication of his 
treatment for bone cancer. He was 67.35 
28. See Gilmore, supra note II, at 243 n.41. 
29. See Portrait Presentation, supra note I, at CVIl; Charles R. Babcock, Ex-Judge 's 
Advice Tipped the Balance for Webster, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1979, at A2. 
30. See Address at 1977 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit [hereinafter 1977 
Ninth Circuit Address], reprinted in 76 F.R.D. 547, 549 ("I had been ajudge for more than 20 
years, and I secretly yearned to get out in front of the bench."). McCree later wrote an article 
suggesting that judges take periodic sabbaticals to refresh their minds. Wade H. McCree, Jr., 
Sabbatical Rejuvenation: 'A CureforJudicial Blahs?, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Nov. 3,1980, 
at 10. McCree may also have yearned for the intellectual stimulation of the SG's office, though 
it is doubtful he would have said so. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 228 ("Judge McCree was 
far smarter and more accomplished than most people with whom he came into contact. But he 
never sought to use his intellect as a club in human dealings. i\..rld he never flaunted power or 
posed as a celebrity .... "). 
31. See Portrait Presentation, supra note I, at CVIl; Eric Freedman, 'Judge's Judge' 
Wade McCree Helped Mold Law, History, DET. NEWS, Sept. 1, 1987, at IB, 5B. 
32. The most famous of the three cases was an interstate dispute over the taxation of 
Howard Hughes' estate. McCree's former boss, Attorney General Griffin Bell, had 
recommended him for the job in that case, writing that he hoped it would be "stimulating and 
financially rewarding." Letter from Griffin Bell to Wade McCree (Jan. 17, 1983) (McCree 
Papers, Box 62-3). 
33. It was widely believ~d that if a spot or two had opened up on the United States 
Supreme Court during the Carter presidency, McCree would have been nominated. See, e.g., 
Uncle Sam's Attorney, supra note 13, at 109. It is also reported that when Justice Thurgood 
Marshall's health began to fail, he was urged to step down so that McCree could take his seat. 
See Ernest Holsendolph, End of an Era: Thurgood Marshall ReSigns, ATLANTA J. & CaNST., 
June 28, 1991, at A8. 
34. See, e.g., Chris Parks, Blanchard: After i 00 Days, the Jury is Still Out, U.P.I., Apr. 
7, 1983. 
35. A sonnet that McCree penned upon the death of his mentor, Harold Bledsoe, was 
a fitting epitaph for McCree as well, given all that he meant to so many people: 
When a tall tree falls, it makes a thund'rous sound 
To tell the forest that a giant is dead, 
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II. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS, CONGRESS, AND THE COURT, 1977-1981 
A. Political Background 
limmy Carter's Presidency saw a return to liberal government after eight 
years of Republican presidential rule.36 Carter did not, however, simply pick 
up where Lyndon 10hnson had left off; the United States had changed 
drastically during the eight-year interregnum. Vietnam and Watergate had 
intensified Americans' distrust of government. The relative economic 
prosperity of the Sixties, which had allowed for the bold liberal social 
experiments of the Great Society, had given way to the "stagflation" of the 
Seventies, which was less conducive to progressive policy. Additionally, after 
George McGovern's crushing defeat in 1972, it seemed that only a relative 
moderate like Carter could hope to win the presidency as a Democrat. 
Still, Nixon had had a somewhat liberal domestic policy agenda; if 
Johnson had been the father of the Great Society, Nixon proved to be a 
surprisingly generous foster parent. What this meant for Carter was that the 
battles he had to fight were largely symbolic, not structural. The question of 
the Johnson era-whether to have a social democratic, progressive welfare 
state-had been answered in the affirmative, and Nixon and Ford had generally 
accepted this result. The new questions were narrower. What would this 
liberal state look like? Who would benefit or suffer at the margins? What 
would be the rank of priorities? Carter had been elected with the 
understanding that he would answer these questions more "liberally" than 
Nixon and Ford, but less so than McGovern. 
And now, there seems an empty plot of ground 
Where once a stalwart presence raised its head. 
But if we look, the ground on which it stood 
Brings forth green seedlings, reaching for the sun 
To find their place as stalwarts in the wood 
Beginning as their parent had begun. 
And so, the great soul whom we mourn today 
Has not left us without a legacy 
A host of fledglings studied 'neath his sway 
Each one may someday be a mighty tree. 
Thus God, His will inexorable ordains 
To make us mortals know that He still reigns. 
Jim Fitzgerald, Wade McCree's Sonnet Makes a Fitting Eulogy, OET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 
1987, at 16F. 
36. See generally GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALDJ. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 
(1982); JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., GOVERNING AMERICA (1981); and BURTON I. KAUFMAN, THE 
PRESIDENCY OF JAMES EARL CARTER, JR. (1993). There are several secondary accounts of the 
Carter Presidency, none of them definitive. Kaufman's comes closest. 
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Specifically, Carter appealed to the American desire for stability and 
honesty in government. Carter made promises and took them seriously, and 
his administration made progress in civil service reform, foreign policy, and 
the environment.37 At times, though, he took his promises too seriously-his 
inability to compromise, or at least to prioritize, meant that his administration 
was often unable to focus, and so failed to achieve many of its goals.38 For 
McCree, this more-than-usual desire to implement campaign promises caused 
more-than-usual tension between fidelity to the law (the internal goal of the 
SG's office) and federal policy demands (the external pressure placed on the 
SG's office).39 
Carter's first Attorney General, Griffin Bell, was an unpopular choice 
among the left wing of the Democratic party. Bell, a judge on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, was a member of Carter's 
Georgia cabal, and was seen as unsympathetic to civil rights.40 Bell chose his 
colleague McCree as Solicitor General,41 and then tapped NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund litigator (and future Clinton SG) Drew Days, III, to head up the 
Civil Rights Division. Commentators characterized the appointments as 
designed solely to appease liberal critics.42 This charge mayor may not have 
been true, but the fact that McCree and Days were black was noted by the 
media much more than the fact that both men combined clear qualifications 
with strong civil rights records, even though only the latter could have truly 
appeased liberal critics.43 Days recalls that Bell had wanted McCree to be his 
SG all along and had hesitated before announcing his choice, fearing the 
appearance of using his colleague as a shield.44 McCree also would not have 
37. See KAUFMAN, supra note 36, at 2. 
38. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 21-22 ("One of the greatest errors [President 
Carter] committed as President was attempting to carry out all his promises .... While trying 
to fulfill scores of promises, President Carter missed carrying out basic reforms."). 
39. See infra Subsections III.D.I-3. 
40. See KAUFMAN, supra note 36, at 27. Among other things, Bell belonged to 
restricted country clubs. Upon Bell's retirement, McCree wrote one of his famous limericks, 
the first verse of which was: "When Judge Bell first came to this hall/his detractors predicted 
a fall/but they all stayed to cheer/as the parting draws near/and we're sure going to miss his 
y'all." Limerick by Wade McCree for Judge Bell (Aug. 14, 1979) (McCree Papers, Box 68-23). 
41. Bell had met McCree in the 1960s when both men were federal appeals court 
judges. As judges, they workeC: together on various commissions and task forces. See Griffin 
Bell, Tribute to Wade McCree, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1053, 1053 (1988). McCree became the 
first black federal judge to serve in the Deep South when he filled in briefly for Bell in May of 
1976. See Stevens, supra note 15, at A14. 
42. See, e.g., John M. Gashko, NAACP Lawyer in Line/or Justice Post, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 27, 1977, at A6. 
43. See, e.g., id. 
44. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 17. 
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taken the job ifhe had felt used in that way, or ifhe had thought that he would 
have had intense disagreements with Bell about fundamental legal questions.45 
Bell and McCree had an unusual; non-hierarchical relationship, examined in 
detail below, that looms large in any account of McCree's tenure as SG. 
Much of the trouble President Carter had leading the nation stemmed 
from his poor relations with Congress, despite the fact that his party controlled 
both houses.46 Part of this difficulty was a result of Carter's own lack of 
focus. Another part resulted from his anti-Washington campaign (which, 
unsurprisingly, alienated many in Washington) and image of himself as a 
populist outsider.47 These factors do not explain everything, though. Another 
factor was that Congress was in a state of flux; the old system of seniority and 
all-powerful committee chairmen was unraveling. Another factor was 
political action committees, which were beginning to assert their control over 
lawmaking, preying on the newly decentralized power structure.48 For our 
purposes, the most important trend in these years, though hardly the most 
prominent one, was that Congress continued to resist efforts at increasing 
presidential power.49 This movement made the separation of powers an 
increasingly important issue in the courts during the Carter Administration. 
B. The Supreme Court 
One factor makes the Supreme Court relatively easy to assess for the four 
years of the Carter Administration-its membership did not change.5o To sum 
up the Court's membership preliminarily (and one-dimensionally): on the 
Right were Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger; in the Center were 
Justices White, Stewart, Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens; on the Left were 
Justices Brennan and Marshall. At the time, the overall balance of the Court 
seemed to have moved significantly to the Right, and the activist advances of 
the Warren Era were halted. Like the Nixon Presidency, though, the Burger 
Court preserved the legacy of its liberal predecessor, even if it did not extend 
45. See Stevens, supra note IS, at A14. 
46. See KAUFMAN, supra note 36, at 20. 
47. See id. at 20-2 I. 
48. See CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 23 (discussing fragmentation of power in Congress 
and rise of special interest politics); KAUFMAN, supra note 36, at 21. 
49. See KAUFMAN, supra note 36, at 21. 
50. See generally THE BURGER COURT (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); THE BURGER COURT 
(Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991); NEITHER CONSERVATIVE NOR LIBERAL: 
THE BURGER COURT ON CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (Francis Graham Lee ed. 1983); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION (1990); 
and THE BURGER YEARS (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987). 
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it.51 In hindsight, the Burger Court was something of a moderate bridge 
between the liberal Warren Court that preceded it and the more conservative 
Reagan/Rehnquist Court that followed it. 
Two areas in which the Court did move noticeably to the Right were 
access to the federal courts and national security. 52 The former manifested 
itself most prominently in a series of opinions rejecting constitutional claims 
by criminal defendants, which provided a stark contrast to the more generous 
precedents of the Warren Court.53 As for national security, this was less a 
result of the Court's change in personnel than of changing times; in its waning 
days, even the Warren Court had reacted conservatively to the crises of war, 
political assassination, and civil unrest.54 Whatever its cause, though, this 
trend toward security in the Court was important and, as seen below, was an 
issue for the SG.55 
Besides its preservation of most Warren Court precedents, the most 
notable trait of the Burger Court was its fractiousness. Due in part to the lack 
of strong leadership by Burger himself, the Court rarely spoke with one voice. 
In both high-profile and minor cases, the number of concurrences, dissents, 
and plurality opinions increased dramatically.56 
Combining this indirection with the change in momentum, away from 
liberal activism and toward moderate tinkering, conditions were prime for the 
conflicts that occurred between the legalistic SG's office and the left-leaning 
Carter Administration. In earlier times, when the Court was liberal and the 
administration conservative, the Court's rulings were at least based on 
transcendent principles, like desegregating schools and providing rights for 
criminal defendants. When the administrations became more liberal, conflict 
abated. After Carter and Burger, the Court moved into more conservative 
territory at the same time as the presidency, which allowed for ideological 
shifts without significant conflict. 
By contrast; when President Carter entered office, the Supreme Court had 
begun to step back from bold precedents. Complicating matters, though, it did 
so with less stark cases, that involved defining boundaries and methods rather 
than establishing broad new categories of rights. To take just one example, 
instead of Brown v. Board of Education,57 and desegregation, there was the 
51. See Anthony Lewis, Foreword to BURGER COURT, supra note 50, at vii-ix. 
52. See BURGER YEARS, supra note 50, at xii-xiii. 
53. See id. at xvi. 
54. See id. 
55. See infra Subsection I1I.D.4.a. 
56. See BURGER YEARS, supra note 50, at 12; NEITHER CONSERVATIVE NOR LIBERAL, 
supra note 50, at 9. 
57. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
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cloudier issue of Milliken v. Bradley,58 and busing. When cases are less stark 
and the Court is a many-headed hydra, it is much easier for legal-realist 
policymakers in the administration to challenge the legal-formalist opinions 
of an SG, and to do so with a straight face. 59 
III. SOLICITOR GENERAL MCCREE 
A. Introduction 
Before turning to an examination of Wade McCree's service as Solicitor 
General, it is important to summarize the typical issues associated with study 
of the office. 
The Solicitor General of the United States is the nation's top appellate 
litigator. His office has three main tasks: deciding which federal cases should 
be appealed to the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court; deciding which 
Supreme Court cases the federal government will participate in as an amicus 
curiae; and briefing and arguing Supreme Court cases in which the United 
States has an interest. 
The SG is also a high-ranking official in the Justice Department, 
originally second in command, then third, and now fourth. A prestigious 
position, the office of the Solicitor General has been occupied by such men as 
William Howard Taft, John Davis, Robert Jackson, Thurgood Marshall, and 
Robert Bork. 
Although the SG is a "political" appointee, selected by the President and 
leaving office when the administration changes hands, the Office of the 
Solicitor General has traditionally been isolated from the political hustle and 
bustle of other segments of the Justice Department. The reason is not 
necessarily respect for the law; rather, it is a functional consideration. The 
Supreme Court relies heavily on the SG to sift through thousands of potential 
government appeals and select only the most worthy to apply for certiorari. 
The Court also depends on the SG to reconcile the conflicting views of the 
federal government's various branches, departments, and independent 
agencies, and to present a unified front. If the Court feels that the SG is 
motivated by politics or policy and is not providing dispassionate legal 
judgments, the Court cannot rely on the SG while preserving its own 
independence. Relatedly, the SG's office would not win its cases nearly as 
58. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
59. In general, McCree conformed to this model, and was not a legal realist-he would 
try in good faith to "find" the law. Only in the rare instances when the law was in equipoise 
would he overtly say that a case could go either way. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 
17. 
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often. In the long run, then, it behooves the executive branch to respect the 
independence of the SO's office and maintain the government's advantage as 
a litigant in the Supreme Court. 
Interest in and study of the SG's office increased dramatically in 1987 
with the publication of The Tenth Justice by Lincoln Caplan. Caplan's book 
is an inside look at what was then an unfamiliar institution. The theme of the 
book was change, specifically the change wrought in President Reagan's 
second term when Charles Fried took over as SG, replacing Reagan's first SG, 
Rex Lee. According to Caplan, Fried's tenure saw a stunning evisceration of 
the traditions of the SG's office, and a squandering of the valuable credibility 
that the SG had earned with the Supreme Court over the years. 
As we will see, Caplan exaggerated the earlier independence of the SG, 
and he almost certainly overstated Fried's "captivity" to political interests (as 
well as speaking too soon, since Caplan wrote the bulk of The Tenth Justice 
after Fried had only served for one Supreme Court term). Nevertheless, the 
book was engaging and sparked a wider interest in the office of the SG, with 
its glamorous case load, proud traditions, and unique institutional position in 
the Justice Department. The year after the publication of The Tenth Justice, 
the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review devoted an entire issue to articles on 
the SG (as well as tributes to the recently deceased McCree).6o 
After this surge in scholarly attention, several themes emerged as 
consistent points of interest, and those themes provide the core around which 
the analysis of this Article is built. Most of them deal in some way with the 
SG's independence from the rest of the Justice Department: the tension 
between independence and the duty to serve the client; the need for continuity 
with the legal positions taken by previous administrations' Solicitors General; 
the practice of reversing positions taken in lower courts, known as confession 
of error; and issues of the independence of the SG's office in general. 
Another group of issues concerns the procedure in which the SO performs his 
duties: defining the government's interest as an amicus curiae; clashes 
between law and policy; and the SG's other administrative duties. A final 
issue concerns structural concerns inherent in the office of the SG-namely, 
centralization of appellate litigating authority for the entire government (i.e. 
the executive branch, legislative branch, and independent agencies) under the 
SG's auspices. 
With hindsight, seeing the transformations wrought in the SG's office 
during the Reagan Administration, Wade McCree's tenure was a relatively 
stable period. As such, it provides a good glimpse of the questions typically 
confronting the SG's office. The apoliticality and independence of the SG's 
60. See 21 LOY. L.A. L. REv. (June 1988). 
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office does not happen by accident, and McCree faced many obstacles in his 
(largely successful) efforts to maintain them. 
This Part begins with a brief summary of General McCree's style as a 
litigator, manager, and oral advocate. It continues with an examination of 
statistics on the SG's office during McCree's tenure, using them to compare 
McCree with other SGs and assess the transitions before and after his term. 
The final and largest section is an analysis of several important cases from 
McCree's term, each of which is selected and presented so as to cast light on 
particular aspects of McCree's approach to the job of SG, in terms of the 
themes listed above. 
B. McCree 
The most obvious characteristic of Wade McCree's style as SG was his 
judicial temperament. This will become more empirically apparent below 
with the examination of specific cases. Some preliminary facts, however, bear 
mention. First, McCree was initially offered the job of Deputy Attorney 
General, the number two post in the Justice Department. He turned down the 
offer, saying that the job would leave him mired in administrative duties; he 
preferred instead the more stimulating and contemplative job of SG.61 
Second, McCree's decision-making style reflected his judicial methods. 
He liked to get input from concerned agencies and interested parties and then 
make his decisions. This is not unusual for an SG, obviously, but one can 
imagine a working environment (such as that described by Caplan) less 
conducive to such careful reflection, one in which deputies, assistants, and 
outside government lawyers knew that they would need to tailor their 
arguments to the personal leanings of the SG. With McCree, by contrast, 
players could rely on getting a fair hearing, and if the law was on their side, 
they could count on getting the SG's office on their side regardless ofpolitical 
or philosophical considerations. 
McCree also went out of his way to include line attorneys in these 
meetings with concerned agencies.62 Even if such conduct is to be expected 
of any SG, McCree was particularly known for his "diplomatic skills," and his 
ability to make decisions without making enemies.63 One anecdote, from 
61. See Footlick & Camper, supra note 6, at 97. 
62. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 228. Judge Edwards remembers that his wife, then 
a lawyer in the Civil Rights Division, was one such line attorney, and that "the recognition and 
appreciation of the line attorneys' efforts demonstrated by Judge McCree's behavior at such 
meetings accomplished more for Justice Department morale than ever could have come from 
formal awards or commendations." Id. 
63. See liNCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 46 (1987). 
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McCree's days as a trial judge, sums up his talent in this regard. A friend 
recalled: 
[A] lawyer left Judge McCree's courtroom and came to join me at the elevator. He 
was somewhat distraught and without waiting, he burst out: "Well, he beat me. he 
beat me."-then a pause-"But he made me like it." Throughout Judge McCree's 
career, his gift for administering the law helped people to understand-and accept it, 
even when 10sing.6-i 
As we will see, McCree's judicial temperament made him a target of 
criticism from political higher-ups in the administration who grumbled about 
the SG's independence and McCree's seeming inability to overrule his 
allegedly conservative subordinates. As we will also see, such criticisms, 
while significant politically, reflected either a lack of understanding or a lack 
of respect for McCree's traditional and effective conduct of the SG's office. 
For his part, McCree had no desire to offend anyone, and seemed happiest 
when he could stake out a good faith legal position that satisfied everybody.65 
McCree seemed to enjoy his role as a decision-maker and manager more 
than his role as oral advocate before the Supreme Court.66 Among other 
reasons, he must have been more used to being a judge, sitting on the other 
side of the bench. This contrast must have been much starker when McCree 
was arguing before the Supreme Court as an advocate than when he was back 
at the office, making decisions and writing briefs in the quasi-judicial mode 
in which the SG has the lUXUry of operating. Still, he was an effective (iflow-
key) oral advocate.67 
McCree earned respect and deference from the Supreme Court, both 
because of his previous career as a respected judge, and because of the 
goodwill accumulated by previous SGs. One extraordinary measure of the 
64. Portrait Presentation, supra note 1, at CIV. 
65. This sentiment is evident in McCree's notes for a speech. See McCree Papers, Box 
67-1. In another speech, McCree cited as an example of finding a successful middle ground the 
case of National Gerimedical Hasp. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378 (1981). See Wade McCree, 
Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, Address for the Tyrell Williams Memorial Lecture 
(Mar. 18, 1981), in 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 337, 341-42 (1981). In that case, the SG's office filed 
an amicus brief that managed to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable positions of the Antitrust 
Division ofthe Justice Department and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 
See id. Antitrust felt that the lower court should be reversed. HHS disagreed. McCree wrote 
a brief that satisfied both parties-he called for reversal on the facts (supporting the Antitrust 
Division's position), but acknowledged that analogous cases with different facts could go the 
other way (supporting the Department of Health and Human Services' position). See id. 
66. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 17. Phone Interview with former 
McCree aide, Paul Levy (May 15, 1997). 
67. See Warren E. Burger, Wade McCree, 21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1051, 1052 (1988) 
(describing McCree's oral advocacy as "balanced," "analytical," and "low key"). 
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esteem in which the Court held McCree is that when President Reagan took 
office, Chief Justice Burger is reported to have lobbied the President to allow 
McCree to stay on as SG until the end of that Supreme Court term, which he 
did.68 
C. Statistics and Comparisons 
An examination of the statistics from Wade McCree's tenure as SG show 
that it was fairly typical. Some departures from trends can be noted, but many 
of these are more easily attributable to external forces and to changes in the 
structure of Supreme Court litigation in general, and not to anything McCree 
did or did not do.69 
The workload of the Court leveled off during McCree's tenure, after a 
steady rise in the previous decades.70 The government's involvement, as a 
percentage of the Court's docket, actually declined slightly,71 but the SG's 
office still churned out a "startling" mass ofwork.72 The success rate enjoyed 
by the SG was also unexceptionally high. The rate of successful certiorari 
applications is generally volatile from year to year, but is uniformly high, and 
for McCree it was not atypically high or low.73 
One departure from long-term trends in these years was McCree's success 
rate as an amicus curiae.74 For the SGs between Sobeloff(in the 50s) and Lee 
(in the 80s), the average victory rate for the SG-as-amicus was well over 70%, 
with some SGs enjoying rates over 80%. McCree's rate of 67%, while high, 
was the lowest in this period. It is unclear what caused this decline. While the 
68. See WASH. STAR, Feb. 6, 1981, at A3 (McCree Papers, Box 25-25). A related 
measure ofthe respect for McCree was that his successor Rex Lee kept two young Assistant SOs 
hired by McCree at the end of his tenure. The two men were Sam Alito, now ajudge on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and Carter Phillips, managing partner of 
the Washington office of Sidley & Austin and a leading private Supreme Court litigator. Mr. 
Phillips related this fact to me when I was a summer associate at Sidley & Austin in 1997. 
69. The analysis in this article concentrates on litigation before the Supreme Court. 
Besides a few scattered references to the other main task of the SO-approving government 
appeals to federal circuit courts-I did not gain from my research any sense of this side of the 
SO's work. 
70. See Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor General: Executive Policy Agendas 
and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1081, 1088 (1994). 
71. See id. at 1089. 
72. See McCree, supra note 65, at 339. With a staff of twenty attorneys, McCree's 
office handled 4,219 "substantive matters" in his last year as SO, including participating in 
argument or submitting a brief in 108 cases. See id. at 339-40. 
73. See Norman-Major, supra note 70, at 1091, 1093. 
74. The figures for amicus success that follow are from Norman-Major, supra note 70, 
at 1097. 
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number of McCree's amicus filings was relatively high, it certainly seems that 
unlike Fried, who had a similarly low amicus success rate,75 McCree did not 
alienate the Court by filing too many adversarial, political, or contra-
precedential amicus briefs.76 
To hazard a hypothesis, these years reflected the modern trend of the 
increased use of the amicus brief. 77 The amicus brief has become a political 
lobbying tool over the decades, more a chance for the government to get its 
two cents in than for it to aid the Court in understanding the law (though this 
latter function is still important). As the amicus brief has become a more 
dominant and less neutral part of the SG's palette, it has begun to resemble 
more the regular, more adversarial briefs that the government files as a party. 
As such, the success rate as amicus has declined to meet the lower success rate 
the government enjoys in regular cases.78 
The final category of statistics is for independent agency litigation. 
McCree accepted a higher percentage of independent agency cases than Robert 
Bork (Nixon and Ford's SG), Rex Lee, or Charles Fried, both as a litigant and 
an amicus.79 McCree's acceptance of independent agency cases has two likely 
explanations. First, the Reagan administration, and by extension its SGs, might 
have felt threatened by independent agencies, given the ideological force of 
Reagan's programs and the unlikelihood that an agency that was truly 
independent would follow along. Second, these differences might reflect the 
different substantive law concerns represented by the cases emerging from 
independent agencies in these years, such as, an increase in court challenges 
to the NLRB during Republican administrations.80 This variation in the type 
of case emerging from the agencies might reflect historical forces, or it might 
stem from the extent of the lack of independence of these agencies. 
Of the independent agency cases that made it to the Court, McCree 
allowed the agency itself to conduct the argument in two-thirds of the cases, 
about the same rate as Bork and much higher than Lee (29%)81 and Fried 
75. See Todd Lochner, The Relationship Between the Office o/Solicitor General and 
the Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 79 VA. L. REv. 549, 561 n.60 (1993). 
76. On Fried, see CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 258, 264-67. McCree was critical of 
Reagan AG Meese's predilection for "seeking abrupt shifts in legal doctrine," which McCree 
labeled "counterproductive." Ted Gest, Now, Meese Takes Lead on Social Policy, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REp., Aug. 12, 1985, at 27. 
77. This hypothesis is based on, and its data taken from, Lochner, supra note 75, at 561. 
78. This leaves Reagan SG Rex Lee as the departure from the trend, not McCree; Lee 
enjoyed tremendous success as an amicus. 
79. See Lochner, supra note 75, at 576. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. at 577. 
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(15%).82 As above, this might reflect greater trust of independent agencies by 
the administration during the Carter years compared to the Reagan years. 
Alternately, it might reflect different notions of trust, inclusion, or delegation 
in the management styles of these four SGs. McCree, for instance, was often 
happy to delegate responsibility for cases to agency lawyers from both 
independent agencies and regular agencies, ifhe felt that they were in the best 
position to handle it.83 
On the substantive level, to conclude this Subsection, it seems that 
McCree took more liberal positions that his two predecessors.84 Only about 
16% of McCree's amicus briefs concerned criminal-rights matters, for 
instance, compared to 44% for Bork.8s Of "rights-oriented cases," McCree 
took a pro-rights position 79% of the time, compared to 62% for 
JohnsonlNixon SG Erwin Griswold and only 40.5% for Bork.86 These data 
partially refute the charges leveled against McCree that he too often relied on 
his more conservative deputies.87 But they suggest an opposite question-given 
McCree'sjudicial temperament, how is it that he reached different results than 
his two predecessors? 
Several non-exclusive explanations are available. First, it might be a 
matter of perspective: perhaps McCree was neutral, while Griswold and Bork 
were more conservative. Second, perhaps McCree was more liberal. As 
anyone working in the law realizes, though, few cases have only one 
objectively "right" answer. If the law is in equipoise, or at least susceptible to 
varying interpretations, people of different ideological stripes can adopt 
opposing positions with full intellectual honesty and legal rigor. Third, this 
disparity might simply reflect the different types of cases coming up to the 
Court. While the SG can choose which cases to pursue, he has no control over 
the cases from which it must choose. The source of appellate cases is trial-
level cases, and the source of those is the Justice Department. Compared to the 
independent and relatively non-partisan SG's office, the ideological 
82. See id. 
83. An example given by Drew Days is Days' own handling of the high-profile 
affirmative-action case of Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (\980). Since Days' office had 
handled dozens of related cases at the trial level, and since Days himself had argued three 
essentially identical cases at the circuit court level, McCree let him handle this major case at the 
Supreme Court level. See Comments from Prof. Drew Days, Yale Law School (May 9, \997). 
84. See Karen O'Connor, The Amicus Curiae Role of the u.s. Solicitor General in 
Supreme Court Litigation, 66 JUDICATURE 256, 262 (\983). 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 263. 
87. See, e.g., CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 237; Tamar Lewin, The Solicitous General 
(article in unknown publication, written during McCree's tenure as SG) (McCree Papers, Box 
25-25). Lewin's article is rare in its negative view of McCree. 
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perspective of the rest of the Justice Department varies significantly from 
administration to administration. Perhaps, then, the more liberal Carter 
Administration simply had more pro-rights cases percolating up to the SG's 
office than did the Republicari administrations. 
D. Cases 
Less speculative than the statistics explored above, the actual cases 
handled by McCree and his office shed light directly on the practices and 
preferences of Wade McCree as SG. This Subsection looks at three of the 
most important cases, each of them highlighting one or more of the particular 
issues traditionally used to analyze the office of the Solicitor General.88 
Following the analysis ofthese cases are brief discussions of the issues that are 
not covered by the first three cases, using other, less significant cases as 
examples. 
1. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 
a. Introduction 
The first case to examine is also in some ways the most atypical. The 
case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hilf'9 dealt with a dam and a fish.90 The 
dam was the Tellico Dam, a multi-million dollar project of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), nearing completion on the Little Tennessee River. 
The fish was the snail darter, a three-inch long species of inedible perch that 
lived upstream from the dam and, apparently, nowhere else. The fish would 
not be able to survive in the immobile reservoir that would be produced if the 
dam were completed.91 
Enter the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).92 The ESA authorizes 
the Secretary of the Interior to declare species endangered, and requires all 
federal departments and agencies to use their power in furtherance of the Act. 
This entails making sure that nothing they do threatens the existence of the 
species or changes a habitat that the Secretary denotes as critical.93 On 
November 10, 1975, President Ford's Secretary of the Interior designated the 
88. This issue/case presentation is somewhat artificial, since each case was about more 
than just one issue; each case is (hopefully) presented in a wide enough context to reflect this. 
89. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
90. See id. at 156; see also BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 42-44. 
91. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 156-60. 
92. See 16 U.S.c. § 1531-44(1994). 
93. See id. § 1531. 
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snail darter as an endangered species and declared the river upstream from the 
dam to be its critical habitat.94 
Despite the fact that this would obviously seem to preclude completion 
of the dam, the TVA continued its construction. Mr. Hill brought suit to enjoin 
construction under the Act's broad standing provisions.95 The district court 
refused to enjoin completion ofthe dam, noting that Congress, fully aware of 
the situation, nevertheless continued appropriations for the dam.96 The court 
used its equitable discretion to allow the TV A to finish the project because it 
was so near completion and so many costs had already been sunk into it.97 
Hill appealed, and the circuit court reversed,98 holding that even the final 
steps of a project were "actions" that could not be done if they would harm the 
species. It also held that Congress would have to specifically exempt the 
project; the indirect step of continuing appropriations was not sufficient.99 The 
vote was 3_0,100 with a concurrence written by none other than Judge Wade 
McCree, who later wrote one of his more famous limericks in response to the 
case: 
Who can surpass the snail darter? 
The fish that would not be a martyr. 
It stymied the dam, 
near the place where it swam, 
Can you think of a fish any smarter?101 
b. Continuity with the Previous Administration 
The TVA appealed to the Supreme Court, with the support of the SG's 
office, and certiorari was granted in November, 1977. 102 McCree had to recuse 
himself from working on the case, since he had heard the case below. 
Normally, that would mean the case would be handled by a deputy. But, in 
keeping with an unofficial tradition in which the Attorney General argues one 
Supreme Court case per term, Griffin Bell took the case. In his memoirs, he 
explained that he took the case in order to assert the independence of the SG's 
office and protect it from a powerful frontal assault by the President's advisors: 
94. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 162. 
95. See id. 
96. See Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 754 (E.O. Tenn. 1976). 
97. See id. at 760, 763. 
98. See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977). 
99. See id. at 1069-70. 
100. See id. 
101. CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 46. 
102. See TVA v. Hill, 434 U.S. 954 {I 977). 
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The power centers, in this case Messrs. Eizenstat and Lipshutz, had persuaded 
President Carter to direct me to switch positions and argue against TVA's position in 
the name of the environment. 
I was in a slow bum. The President wanted me to change my position without 
any change in the law or facts. I wrote him a memorandum pointing out that he had 
not been shown an earlier memorandum in which I warned of the danger of reversing 
a legal position the [Ford] Justice Department had expressed to the court on behalf of 
the government. The government would be speaking with an unclear, inconsistent 
voice if it did an about-face in the midst of an appeal. 
"A reversal of that position, coming at this juncture, would (sic) not but 
undermine the respect traditionally accorded the Department [of Justice] and the 
Office of the Solicitor General by the justices on the Court," I said in the earlier 
memorandum. 
"Second, a reversal of position on the case would well be publicly perceived as 
the administration imposing its policy views on the Justice Department despite the 
department's contrary judgment of the law." 
When I met with the President, I told him that ethically I could not do it. He 
changed his mind and told me to stick with the original position. Nevertheless, I 
added: "Your staff is not serving you well.,,103 
Bell's vigorous defense of the principle that the position of a previous SG 
should generally bind subsequent SGs was effective. From the SG's 
standpoint, Bell was the ideal AG: sensitive to the traditions of the SG's office 
and their importance, and willing to use his own political capital to protect 
them. 
c. Independence of the SG's Office 
The problem in TVA v. Hill was not that the SG had to decide whether or 
not to be consistent. That was a relatively easy decision. Rather, the problem 
was that the President was weighing in. As we will see, this was not the last 
time that the President's advisors showed their preference for a politically 
flexible SG's office. Coming as it did so early in Carter's presidency, this 
attack on the SG's autonomy was particularly crucial for Bell to derail. 
Unfortunately, Bell's account of the incident, quoted above, is 
incomplete. Bell was not completely successful in fending off the 
administration's desire to change its position. Perhaps this mixed result 
explains why the President's advisors were so persistent in their later efforts 
103. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 43-44. Ordinarily, the selection of the AG's 
annual case was not as strategic a process, or at least not as unilaterally the choice of the AG. 
See, e.g., Letter from Wade McCree to Benjamin Civiletti (Aug. II, 1980) (McCree Papers, 31-
9) (suggesting the Fedorenko case as an appropriate one for AG Civiletti to argue). But see 
Robert Pear, Civiletti Will Argue War-Crime Case at High Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I, 1980, at 
A24 (calling Civiletti's handling of Fedorenko an election year political maneuver). 
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to control the SO's office. Lack of success aside, Bell showed in all of these 
cases that he understood the need for an independent SO. 
Bell's incomplete victory was embodied in an appendix attached to the 
brief for the United States. Written by Interior Secretary Cecil Andrus, the 
appendix took the pro-fish position the Carter administration had asked Bell 
to adopt. Significantly, the appendix was authorized by the White House, and 
Bell approved ofits inclusion. Bell claimed that while he had indeed approved 
the White House/Interior request, he had done so reluctantly, and cited the 
strength and sincerity of Secretary Andrus' environmental views as a partial 
justification. 104 
While it is certainly reasonable for the SO to accommodate divergent 
views, and while this occasionally entails including a separate brief, part of the 
SO's job is to take such heat; to absorb the assaults of those with strong but 
adverse opinions. The fact that it was not just Andrus' views but Carter's 
authorization that led to the inclusion of the appendix must have been troubling 
to anyone who valued the independence of the SO's office. It was no doubt 
troubling to Bell, who must have concluded, reluctantly, that he had already 
spent enough political capital on the case. If it had been the lower-ranking 
McCree handling the case instead of his boss, it seems likely that the pressure 
on the SO's office would have been stronger and would have done even more 
damage. 
While presenting divergent views was not wholly unprecedented,105 such 
an appendix meant that the government was not presenting a unified argument. 
While Bell argued only the pro-dam side when he appeared before the Court, 
the Court did not let the internal administration split pass without notice. An 
annoyed Justice Powell asked why the administration had not worked this issue 
out at the Cabinet level. Bell was happy to agree with Powell, saying that he 
concurred that the government should speak with one voice before the Court. 106 
Nevertheless, Bell had allowed the appendix in, 107 and so was in effect asking 
104. See Charles Mohr, Bell Urges Court to Permit Dam to Open Despite Peril to Rare 
Fish, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1978, atAl9. 
105. See infra Subsection III.D.3.c. 
106. See Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court 
Advocacy: An Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U. PUGET 
SOUNDL. REv. 89, 103 (1978) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-30, TVA v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701». 
107. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 44. 
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the Court to resolve the administration's internal disagreement. los The Court, 
as evidenced by Powell's question, had no desire to act in that capacity. 
At the very least, the incident belies one analyst's legal-realist contention 
that "[t]he solicitor general will be at least sympathetic to, if not totally 
supportive of, the president's policy agenda."lo9 
In any event, construction on the dam was enjoined, a victory for 
environmentalists. 110 The victory was short-lived, however, because Congress 
took action and specifically exempted the dam from the ESA in 1979. The 
dam went into operation and the reservoir was formed. The next year, 
ironically, the Fish and Wildlife Service discovered living snail darters, quite 
non-extinct, in a creek eighty miles downstream from the dam!ll 
In response to the internal wrangling over the position of the United States 
in the case, and given the complicated intermediate role of the AG, the Justice 
Department's Office of Legal Counsel prepared a memorandum laying out the 
bounds of the Solicitor General's traditional independence. 112 Since it dealt in 
large degree with the classification of questions as law as opposed to policy, 
and since it was not finalized until after the controversy in the Bakke case, the 
memo is discussed at the end of the next Section. 
2. The Regents o/the University o/California v. Bakke 
a. Introduction 
The Regents o/the University o/California v. Bakke I 13 case was probably 
the most important one to pass through the SG's office during Wade McCree's 
service. 114 Justice Powell called his opinion in the case his "most important," 
108. This interpretation was also offered by Prof. Drew Days in his comments at Yale 
Law School on May I, 1997. For his part, Bell cites this case as an example of the lack of 
coordination within the administration in general, which he blames in part for the lack of 
direction in the Carter presidency. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 44. 
109. REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW 68 
(1992). 
110. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 495. 
III. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 44. 
112. See lOp. Off. Legal Counsel 228 (1977), reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1089 
(1988). See also infra Subsection II1.D.2.d. 
113. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
114. See generally BELL&OSTROW, supra note 36, at 29-32; CALIFANO, supra note 36, 
at 231-43; CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 39-45; JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE 
BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 162-95 (1979); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: 
ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 199-201 (1991); TIMOTHY 1. 
O'NEILL, BAKKE AND THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY 179-91 (1985); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND 
BAKKh': AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 47, 52-53 (1988); and John Osborne, 
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and said that the case "aroused more interest in the nation, the press and the bar 
than any I have seen in my [15 years] on the [C]ourt.,,115 It was certainly the 
one most often mentioned in connection with McCree's service as SG after his 
tenure ended. 
Bakke dealt with the struggles of Allan Bakke, a white, 38-year-old 
medical school applicant, who had been denied admission to the University of 
California at Davis Medical School. I16 The school had a special.admissions 
program under which a certain number of openings were reserved for Blacks, 
Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. ll7 Bakke believed that he would 
have been admitted were it not for the special program; he argued that he was 
more qualified than some of the minority admittees, and that such a use of race 
in the admissions process violated equal protection. I IS The California Supreme 
Court ruled in Bakke's favor, the university appealed, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on February 22, 1977, just a month after President Carter 
took office. I 19 
b. Defining the Government's Interest as Amicus 
On the same day that the Court granted certiorari, the appellate lawyers 
for the University-Paul Mishkin and former SG Archibald Cox-met with 
McCree and Civil Rights Division chief Drew Days. Mishkin and Cox sought 
the support of the United States as an amicus, but McCree and Days were not 
impressed with their arguments and were concerned about the poor state of the 
record in the case. 120 
From there, the process continued typically enough. Days coordinated the 
effort to poll the concerned government agencies and departments (HEW, 
Carter's Brief, THE NEW REpUBLIC, Oct. 15, 1977, at 13. In addition to these sources and the 
numerous newspaper and magazine accounts to be found on the case, the recollections of Drew 
Days were helpful. The Osborne article provides the best chronology of the main events in the 
production of the brief, but concludes too readily that the President influenced the content of 
the brief. McCree turned down Osborne's request for an interview in preparation ofthe article. 
See Memorandum from Wade McCree (Sept. 21, 1977) (McCree Papers, Box 28-8). 
115. Tony Mauro, Back to Bakke: The Recently Released Thurgood Marshall Papers 
Cast New Light on California's Affirmative Action Supreme Court Case, CAL. LAW., Jan. 14, 
1994, at 50, 55. See generally Elliot E. Slotnick, Television News and the Supreme Court: A 
Case Study, 77 JUDICATURE 21 (1993) (discussing extent and nature of media coverage of 
Bakke). 
116. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276. 
117. See id. at 272-75. 
118. See id. at 277-78. 
119. See id. at 280. 
120. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 163; Interview with Drew Days, 
supra note 17. 
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HUD, Labor, the EEOC, and the President's Commission on Civil Rights) to 
see ifthey supported the government's participation in the case. All ofthem 
did. 121 In June, the typical preparatory meeting was held-with McCree, Days, 
and the representatives of the concerned agencies-yielding a consensus in 
favor of affirmative action, but against quotas. 122 
Days recommended filing in favor of the university, in favor of 
affirmative action. The Assistant SG on the case, Frank Easterbrook, made a 
different recommendation. Easterbrook viewed the law as requiring color-
blindness: it did not matter what Bakke's race was; ifhe had received unequal 
treatment because of it, he was entitled to a remedy. 123 Such a split of opinion 
was not unusual, and if all else had gone normally, it probably would have 
been resolved in the typical way. As we have seen, McCree was a consensus 
builder, and was skilled at figuring out mutually acceptable solutions to such 
impasses. Perhaps he would have taken a middle ground, less race-blind than 
Easterbrook, but less race-conscious than Days. 
Unfortunately, it soon became clear that the normal course was not an 
option. Because the case aroused such enormous interest all around the 
country, the Carter Administration had to start making statements on the case 
before the brief was finished. 124 This is, of course, a typical problem facing the 
SG's office-legal niceties are inevitably overwhelmed, in the popular 
perception, by political and ideological considerations. Carter himself told 
reporters, inexplicably, that the brief would be prepared by Attorney General 
Bell and HEW Secretary Joe Califano (also a lawyer); he did not mention 
McCree. 125 
It is unclear if Carter's statement emboldened Califano, or if the liberal 
Secretary would have spoken out anyway, but Califano, in a graduation speech 
in June, voiced support for "numerical goals" instead of "quotas." This subtle 
distinction was lost on many, and a flare-up erupted among anti-quota citizens' 
groups worried by Califano's statements. The administration responded by re-
affirming its stance, between affirmative action and quotas, to the Right of 
Califano. 126 Califano persisted, continuing to press vigorously for a strong 
defense of affirmative action, upsetting some in the SG's office who felt that 
121. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 163. 
122. See id. at 164. 
123. See CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 41. 
124. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 167. 
125. See Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign & Domestic Policy 
Matters, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1977, at A8. While McCree himself was busy for the first part 
of the summer and came into the process in earnest relatively late, his office was certainly 
involved in writing the brief. See CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 42. 
126. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 164-65. 
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the Secretary was trying to "stampede the Administration into supporting" the 
University .127 
The brief-writing team met frequently with citizen groups on both sides. 
On one end were groups, like the Congressional Black Caucus, the National 
Conference of Black Lawyers, and the Institute for the Study of Educational 
Policy, urging firm support of affirmative action, and a soft line on quotas. On 
the other end were groups (most prominently Jewish ones) urging a firm anti-
quota stance, and other groups opposed to affirmative action altogether. 128 
Representatives of the Asian-American community provided additional 
pressure. 129 Following the customary process for the SG's office, Days and 
two of his assistants, Brian Landsbergh and Jessica Silver, wrote a first draft 
of the brief, which then went on to Easterbrook and Deputy SG Lawrence 
Wallace. 130 
In retrospect, the most striking thing about the entire brief-writing process 
is how little difference there was between Easterbrook and Days from a legal 
standpoint. This is not to say that they agreed, but rather that the final brief 
ended up between Days' and Easterbrook's positions, near the same place that 
the brief probably would have ended up without any pressure from outside 
groups. While there were, no doubt, some legal arguments presented by 
pressure groups inside and outside the government, most of the input the brief-
writers received was policy-based noise. 
Easterbrook revised the form of Days' draft "substantially" but changed 
the legal argumentation relatively little.131 In his memorandum on the case to 
McCree, Easterbrook admitted that he "st[ ood] alone" in his support of Allan 
Bakke, but he downplayed the importance of that stance because his legal 
approach "would legitimate important aspects of color-conscious relief.,,132 
The main reason that Easterbrook and Days seemed so far apart, and the 
primary reason that public perception was so inaccurate, was that Easterbrook 
recommended supporting Bakke instead of the University, and he used 
127. O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 182. 
128. See id. at 183. 
129. The main problem with the Bakke case for Asian-American leaders was that the 
university lumped all Asians together into one group. Doing so masked the diversity of Asians 
in the United States, in particular the vast divide between those groups that were thriving and 
those that warranted the same treatment given to other disadvantaged minorities. Box 27-3 of 
the McCree Papers contains a stack of letters an inch thick concerning the Asian issue. In 
addition, the issue took up a significant amount of McCree's time during the oral argument of 
the case. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 52. 
130. See Osborne, supra note 114, at 14. 
131. See id. 
132. Memorandum from Frank Easterbrook to Wade McCree at I (Jun. 9, 1977) 
(McCree Papers, Box 27-2). 
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typically (and misleadingly) strong language in doing so. Since any headlines 
would only announce which side the government supported, it would obviously 
be lost on the public if even the pro-Bakke faction found some affirmative 
action constitutionally acceptable. 
Easterbrook felt that the best approach to the case would be to avoid the 
merits altogether, but he felt that the issue was too squarely presented to take 
that path. 133 He downplayed the importance of the case, pointing out that the 
Court had already made strong statements that race could be taken into 
account, 134 and not just for remedial purposes. 135 If Bakke could be limited to 
its facts, Easterbrook argued, the California Supreme Court could be affirmed 
without threatening the use elsewhere of criteria with racially-conscious 
impact, race-sensitive recruiting, or "ties-go-to-the-minority" rules.136 
Easterbrook urged McCree to make "a dispassionate and rounded 
presentation," which "would be a welcome relief from the hysterical and 
hyperbolic briefs being filed by the parties and other amici.,,137 This was ironic 
advice, given McCree's solid reputation for cool, collected judicial reasoning, 
and Easterbrook's reputation for legally sound but extreme, often harsh and 
inflammatory arguments. 138 
Because ofthe importance of the case, and because Bell had mistakenly 
said at an early August press conference that the administration had decided 
to support the university,139 the White House began pressing to see a copy of 
133. See id. at 2. 
134. See Linmark Ass'n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). It is unclear why 
Easterbrook chose this case as an example, since it held that First Amendment commercial 
speech rights trump the goal (declared by the Court to be nevertheless significant) of integrated 
housing. 
135. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
136. See generally Memorandum from Easterbrook, supra note 132. 
137. See id. at 42. 
138. Easterbrook seemed to cause more than his share of trouble for the SG, both in this 
case and in Bakke. As Drew Days remembers, Easterbrook was a "likeable kid" who had the 
unfortunate trait of overdoing his legal arguments. Comments from Drew Days, supra note 108. 
While, as we have seen, the stridency in his briefs often caused problems from a public relations 
standpoint, Easterbrook would not have risen to the rank of Deputy if his legal judgments were 
unsound. For his part, Easterbrook himself points out that regardless of what his critics said at 
the time, the important fact is that McCree always backed him up. Comments of Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, New York City (March 7, 1998). One insider remembers Easterbrook as 
uncompromising and pompous, but extremely bright and articulate, and potentially 
"demolishing" in arguments. McCree respected Easterbrook for the latter traits while clearly 
aware of the former. Although Easterbrook was something of an ideologue, the problems he 
caused were less because he was conservative than because he was often tactless. 
139. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 166; O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 
183. 
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the brief. At this stage, the brief was still undergoing substantial revision, 
which was typical for any brief in so important and complicated a case. 
Internal memoranda by McCree's special assistant criticized the quality of the 
brief, asserting that entire sections would need to be re-written. 14o Clearly, it 
would be some time before the brief reached its final form. 
This part of the story continues, with details of the White House's 
involvement, in the next Subsection. For the purposes of the present 
Subsection, the important thing to note is that the White House did get a copy 
of the brief, and that it was leaked to the press. 141 Since at that stage in its 
preparation the brief was still pro-Bakke rather than pro-university, the press 
reports caused an explosion.142 Concerned that the brief would oppose 
affirmative action (and, in some cases, assuming that it did), civil rights leaders 
and other interested parties flooded the White House and the Justice 
Department with letters and telegrams. Meetings were arranged in an attempt 
to unruffle some of the more prominent feathers, and soon it became clear that 
the disagreements were between the politicians' political objections and 
"McCree's intellectual approach to the law.,,143 
This was certainly true with regard to Secretary Califano. Toward the end 
of the process, Califano met with McCree, Easterbrook, and Wallace, and 
recalled "I was surprised at how angry I was becoming as the young lawyers 
spun their legalistic theories. McCree sat there, remarking simply that he had 
to follow the existing case law[.]"I44 Later, Califano wrote an angry 
memorandum to Bell, McCree, and Days, complaining (with un-self-conscious 
irony) that "[t]he brief is still, in my judgment, far too preoccupied with the 
Bakke case and not concerned enough with providing a ringing endorsement 
of affirmative action.,,)4S 
Although Califano made plenty oflegal arguments, mostly concerning the 
proper standard of review to use in such cases, he seemed most concerned with 
getting McCree to treat the brief as more of a political document. He 
140. See Memoranda from Paul Alan Levy to Wade McCree (Aug. 21 and 28, 1978) 
(McCree Papers, Box 28-5). Levy was one of McCree's judicial clerks when McCree was 
appointed SG. He accompanied McCree to Washington, where his responsibilities included 
writing speeches and occasionally reviewing draft briefs such as these to give McCree yet 
another viewpoint to consider. Levy's memoranda said that Easterbrook's drafts were "weak," 
and that Easterbrook was saving affirmative action at the expense of the strength of the strict 
scrutiny standard. See O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 184. 
141. See 0 'NEILL, supra note 114, at 184. 
142. See id. 
143. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 167. 
144. CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 237. 
145. Letter from Joseph Califano to Griffin Bell (Sept. 10, 1977) (McCree Papers, Box 
27-2). 
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suggested rewriting the brief in four sections. The first would declare the 
importance of affirmative action in the United States; the second would argue 
for weaker "rational basis" review in these cases instead of strict scrutiny; the 
third would assert the principles of a valid affirmative action program; the 
fourth, finally, would deal with Bakke itself, arguing that the case should be 
reversed and remanded. This, Califano wrote, would "put the emphasis where 
it belongs.,,146 As for the law itself, even Califano agreed that a pure quota 
would be unconstitutional. 147 Opposite to Califano's approach was an internal 
memo to McCree arguing that the brief of the United States should be 
''judicial'' and should help the Court to sift through the thousands of pages of 
briefs from the parties and the unprecedented number of amici. 148 
This divide reflected the tension between the "old" and "new" 
conceptions of the amicus brief. 149 Under Califano's "new" view, the United 
States had an interest in the case. While it was not a party, it was submitting 
a brief. That brief should assert the interest of the United States, and do so 
vigorously. Under the "old" view, by contrast, the role of the SG was, quite 
literally, to be a friend of the court-to provide guidance, given its experience 
and inside knowledge of the federal government, regarding the effect the case 
would have on federal programs. 
The final content of the brief was determined by McCree and Days. 
Spending all day, every day, for a week on the brief, McCree, Days, and an 
assistant from each of their offices hammered out the final form. Reminiscent 
of his years as a judge, McCree pored over the language of the brief, line by 
line and word by word, making sure that each detail was correct, each word 
appropriate. In retrospect, Days surm ises that the form of the brief was not 
much different than it would have been had no outside pressure been placed on 
McCree. lso Some compromise between the Easterbrook and Days positions 
would have been reached eventually. As it happened, the final brief defended 
the legality of affirmative action, rejected that of quotas, and, in its main thrust, 
said that the record in the case was inadequate to determine the proper result 
for Bakke himself. 151 
Because of this approach, the focus was taken off of Bakke and placed on 
affirmative action and quotas in a more abstract sense, just as Califano had 
wanted. But saying that the record was inadequate was not just a cop-out to 
allow McCree to split the difference between two incompatible positions, or 
146. Id. at 4. 
147. See id. at 2. 
148. See Memoranda from Levy, supra note 140. 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
150. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 17. 
151. See O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 186-87. 
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to allow the brief to make a political statement. Days remembers that it had 
been obvious from the beginning that the record was poor. 152 It was unclear 
why exactly Bakke had not been admitted, and the bounds of the university's 
program were sim ilarly fuzzy. Indeed, the one thing that Easterbrook and Days 
seemed to agree on was that the case was a "poor vehicle" for declaring an 
administration position on affirmative action. ls3 Furthermore, while 
Easterbrook had still recommende~ reaching the merits, even his draft evinced 
some legal support for affirmative action-McCree was not running away from 
the law either. 
The oral argument in Bakke was McCree's most important as SG. All 
eyes were on him as the only black lawyer before the Court. McCree was not 
a dynamic oral advocate, but he was a solid and effective one. It often seems, 
upon reviewing the assessments of oral arguments by commentators, that most 
expect effective oral advocacy before the Supreme Court to be flashy. That 
was not McCree's style, but neither is it the best way to deal seriously with the 
Court. 
Though he was sidetracked for a long time on the question of how to 
classify Asian-Americans,ls4 McCree effectively challenged the California 
Supreme Court's contention that race could not even be used as a factor in 
properly tailored affirmative action programs. He also contributed one 
powerful passage that even a critic complimented: 
"[M]any children born in 1954, when Brown was decided, are today, 23 years later, 
the very persons knocking on the doors of professional schools, seeking admission 
about the country. They are persons who, in many instances, have been denied the 
fulfillment of the promise of that decision because of resistance to this Court's 
decision .... " In such a situation, "to be blind to race today is to be blind to 
reality.,,'5; 
The Court's fragmented decision concurred with McCree's assessment. While 
the Court did not agree that the record was insufficient for a determination 
(perhaps because it was, ironically, less politically able than McCree to make 
such a legalistic determination in so important a case), it did support the 
general formula of "affirmative action OK, quotas not OK" that had been the 
core of the government's position from the beginning. 
The case had been personally nerve-wracking for McCree. One friend 
called it "the most excruciating experience of his life.,,156 He had worked all 
of his life to put race to one side and do his job as best he could. In his career, 
152. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
153. See CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 44 & n.53. 
154. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 52. 
155. Id. at 52-53 (footnote omitted). 
156. Footlick & Camper, supra note 6, at 97 (internal quotes omitted). 
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McCree had proven that he was not first and foremost a black judge, but just 
ajudge, with the most appropriate modifier being "intellectual." In acquiring 
the job of Solicitor General, he found himself thrust onto center stage in a case 
that would not let him simply be the SG, but cast him instead as the black SG. 
Enormous pressure was put on McCree to take a strong, pro-university position 
because of his race, pressure which he resisted. "At one point in the 
discussions," one account reports, "McCree rejected the suggestion that he 
should be true to 'the black community.' 'I have to be true to myself,' he 
asserted.,,157 
It did not make McCree feel any better that his race spared him criticism 
as well. 158 In all likelihood, the most disappointing aspect of his treatment 
came from responses like that from Joe Califano. Califano recognized that 
"McCree had been an outstanding judge before becoming Solicitor General, 
and his temperament was to compensate for all personal biases in fulfilling the 
obligation to judge fairly. I was concerned that McCree was carrying so much 
personal freight on this issue that he could not decide it objectively.,,159 
In contrast to the litigant who had accused Judge McCree of being unable 
to avoid favoring Blacks,16O Califano felt that SG McCree was being too fair. 
He was damned ifhe did and damned ifhe didn't, but he bore this weight with 
his typical quiet dignity, and perseveredly performed his duties. 161 
c. Independence of the SG's Office 
There is another entire chapter to the Bakke brief story-the extent to 
which the White House participated in its preparation. At one level, White 
House participation in brief-writing is no more exceptional than that of any 
other interested government agency. In extreme cases, though, White House 
involvement smacks of pulling rank. In addition, because the White House is 
the center of political accountability in the executive branch, it can introduce 
political considerations into the SG's briefs, and thereby damage the hard-
fought credibility the SG's office has obtained with the Court. As Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote a decade later, "I don't think the White House is well 
157. DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 171. 
158. Benjamin Hooks, in criticizing President Carter for the brief, hesitated to criticize 
McCree because he was not sure what McCree's role was in the process. This is ironic, given 
that, as we will see, McCree resisted White House efforts to take a stronger pro-university 
position. Another black leader reported that McCree would have been "ripped to shreds by 
most of us" had he been white. Vernon Jarrett, When Skin Color Delays Criticism, CHI. TRlB., 
Sept. 16, 1977, § 3, at 4. 
159. CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 237. 
160. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
161. See CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 237. 
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served by having a Solicitor General come to the Court and read the legal 
equivalent of a press release.,,162 
In Bakke, this problem presented itself quite vividly. Administration 
officials showed little concern or respect for the traditional independence of 
the SG's office. Because Bakke was a case with such important political 
ramifications, White House staffers recognized that the government's brief 
would be read very carefully as a policy statement by the administration on 
civil rights. 163 They were correct in thinking this,l64 but it was their first,'and 
only, concern. 
In late August, impatient to see the brief, the White House l65 arranged for 
a meeting between Easterbrook, Wallace, Stuart Eizenstat (chief domestic 
policy advisor to the President), and Robert Lipshutz (the President's counsel). 
The tone of the meeting was frosty. Easterbrook and Wallace told the men that 
while the President had the "right to make any contribution he wanted to make 
to the brief,"166 he would have to do so through Bell, not McCree. 167 They 
added, strongly, that "they would deplore any substantial White House 
interference.,,168 
The next step is described by Bell, who in this passage from his memoirs 
saw clearly the root of the conflict: 
After a good deal of writing and rewriting, McCree gave me the initial draft. I then 
made perhaps my greatest mistake with regard to the power centers at the White 
House. . .. [I took] a copy ofthe draft friend-of-the-court brief with me to the White 
House when I went to tell the President what position we were developing .... That 
started wide circulation of the brief. '69 
The briefwas quickly disseminated around Washington, including, according 
to one report, an anonymous, cloak-and-dagger transfer of a copy of the brief 
162. CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 45 (internal quotes omitted). 
163. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 166. 
164. The New York Times wrote that the government's position in Bakke 
is important for two reasons. First, its brief may have some influence on the Supreme 
Court in a case that some black leaders describe as the most significant civil rights 
case in 20 years. Second, and perhaps more important, the brief will presumably 
clarify the Administration's overall civil rights policy. 
David E. Rosenbaum, Justice Dept. Brie/Opposes Race Quota at Coast University, N. Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 8, 1977, at AI (emphasis added). 
165. The White House is mentioned instead of President because this was the work of 
the staff, not Carter himself. In the absence of knowing exactly which staffer was behind this 
arrangement, "White House" seems to be the most appropriate term. 
166. Osborne, supra note 114, at 15. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. 
169. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 29-30. 
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by leaving it in the back seat of a taxicabYo As a result ofthe release ofthe 
unfinished brief, suggestions and irate criticism began flowing in from all over 
the government and private sector. 171 Eizenstat, Lipshutz, and Vice President 
Mondale were particularly upset with what they perceived as the briefs weak 
policy advocacy,172 and Mondale led an effort within the administration to 
influence the content of the brief.173 
In an early September memo to Carter, Eizenstat and Lipshutz wrote the 
brief needed to be less "dispassionate," bolder in its defense of affirmative 
action, and more sensitive to the fact that it was a political document, not just 
a legal one.174 In his response to the memo, the President told Eizenstat and 
Lipshutz to "[j]ump into [the] drafting process.,,175 Eizenstat gave a copy of 
his memo to Bell's Special Assistant, Terry Adamson, who relayed a version 
of it to McCree without saying from where it came. 176 At a meeting with 
Eizenstat, Lipshutz, Bell, and Adamson, Mondale declared that the President 
wanted the brief to be pro-affirmative action and anti-quota. Bell confirmed 
that the brief would have that viewpoint (as indeed, it would have had, in one 
form or another, anyway). 177 Bell instructed Adamson, however, not to relay 
Mondale's comments to McCree, saying that there was enough pressure on the 
SG already. 178 
As we have seen in the Hill case, Bell felt strongly about the 
independence of the SG's office. As Caplan puts it, Bell "believed the Justice 
170. See DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 167-68. 
171. The Congressional Black Caucus was particularly vigorous in its lobbying efforts. 
See, e.g., William Claiborne, Hill Black Caucus Warns Carter on Stand on Quotas, WASH. 
POST, Sep. 13, 1977, at AI. At a CBC banquet a few days after the brief was filed, President 
Carter jokingly thanked the Congressional Black Caucus for its "gracious" assistance in 
preparing the brief. McCree sat unsmiling but said later that he had not heard Carter's 
comment. Jacqueline Trescott, The Caucus and the Comic, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1977, at B 1. 
172. Days recalls that the main pressure from within the administration came from 
Mondale and Eizenstat, who he remembers had no desire to allow the Justice Department to 
maintain its independence. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 17. 
173. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 28-29. President Carter cited Mondale's 
strong role in the Bakke case to refute claims that Mondale was losing influence within the 
administration. See Osborne, supra note 114, at 15. 
174. See CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 44; DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 167-
68; Osborne, supra note 114, at 15. 
175. CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 44. 
176. See Osborne, supra note 114, at 15. Osborne claims that Easterbrook and Wallace 
"were more familiar than they wished to be" with the memo, but that McCree did not see it. Id. 
No other sources report that McCree or anyone else received such detailed direct commands 
from the White House. 
177. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 31. 
178. See id. 
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Department should be as free from political meddling as a courthouse,,,179 a 
sentiment that no doubt applied with even greater vigor when it came to the 
SO's office. 180 Adamson systematically filtered suggestions from the White 
House to the brief-writers, but removed any reference to their origin, so that 
the input was of the same type as the suggestions that regularly flowed into the 
SO's office from concerned agencies and citizens. Some minor suggestions, 
unproblematic to McCree and Days, were relayed as being from the White 
House and were implemented. For instance, at the White House's request, the 
term "race-conscious" was struck out of the brief and replaced with "race-
sensitive."181 
The pressure for presidential intervention continued to mount. Califano 
in particular agitated for it. A few days before the brief was filed, Califano 
wrote a confidential memo to the President. In a portion of the memo not 
reproduced in his memoirs, Califano told the President that while "it is, of 
course difficult, at this late hour, for you to get deeply involved in the Bakke 
brief even though the case presents issues of manifestly Presidential 
importance, ... you may [nevertheless] want to hear the divergent views 
yourself.,,182 
Califano had come away from his meeting with Easterbrook and Wallace 
upset that "two bright young white holdovers from the Nixon 
administration"183 were shaping the government's position and McCree was 
letting them. 184 The problem thus seems to have been that Califano saw the 
law and policy aspects of the case as inextricably linked. He also saw Wallace 
(who had been hired, incidentally, during the Johnson Administration) and 
Easterbrook as conservative ideologues with an agenda, and McCree as having 
had the wool pulled over his eyes. From such a viewpoint, there was no reason 
to insulate the SO's office from the President. The problem was that 
Califano's viewpoint was wrong, and gave inadequate credit to McCree's legal 
judgment. And, while there were some policy issues for the SO to sort through 
in the brief, the White House's heavy-handed rank-pulling made it difficult for 
McCree to do so effectively. 
In the end, the only thing that prevented the White House from wresting 
total control of the brief-writing process from McCree was the fact that White 
House staffers eventually became satisfied with the government's brief. When, 
179. CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 45. 
180. See id. 
181. See Interview with Drew Days, supra note 17. 
182. See Memorandum from Joseph Califano to Jimmy Carter (Sept. 9, 1977) (McCree 
Papers, Box 27-2). McCree apparently received a copy of this memo. 
183. CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 237. 
184. See id. 
HeinOnline -- 1998 Det. C.L. Rev. 736 1998
736 Law Review [3:703 
as the filing deadline drew near, Eizenstat was still not satisfied with the brief, 
Adamson made a phone call on September 10 to McCree, who was in 
Detroit. 18s McCree described the four main points that the brief would take in 
its final form: that affirmative action was constitutional; that quotas were not; 
that the case was an inadequate vehicle for determining the limits of 
affirmative action and should be remanded; and that the government was 
indifferent as to what happened to Mr. Bakke in particular. 
A memo from Eizenstat and Lipshutz to Mondale approved these points 
but complained that the brief did not match that structure. 186 Assured that the 
brief would be adjusted to fit the four-point framework, however, they were 
satisfied, as was the President. 187 Califano disliked the decision to criticize the 
adequacy of the record rather than to make a strong defense of affirmative 
action. At this point, Califano said rather remorselessly, "the Justice 
Department was 'climbing the walls' about [his] involvement"188 in the brief, 
and even Lipshutz felt Califano was "meddling.,,189 
Everything came to a head at a Cabinet meeting on September 12.190 
Califano and HUD Secretary Patricia Harris urged Carter to take a stronger 
position in favor of affirmative action in the brief. U.N. Ambassador Young 
and Labor Secretary Marshall agreed. But Bell stuck up for McCree and for 
the independence of the SG' s office, and said that "he doubted he would 
'circulate any more briefs in the future. ",191 Most significantly, the President 
did not change his mind. While work on the brief continued for the next 
couple of days, and while pressure from government agencies and private 
groups intensified, the White House no longer attempted to influence the 
content of the brief. 
185. McCree maintained his residence in Detroit during his tenure, paying his taxes there 
and keeping his Michigan license plates. Wade McCree: His Life and Career Were 
Distinguished by Dignity, Integrity, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 31, 1987, at 8A. 
186. See Memorandum from Stuart Eizenstat and Robert Lipshutz to Walter Mondale 
(Sept. 10, 1977) (McCree Papers, Box 27-2). It is unclear what this memo is doing in McCree's 
papers, given the great efforts taken by Bell to insulate McCree from the events at the White 
House. There is, however, no evidence to contradict McCree, Bell's, and Days' recollection of 
the successful insulation of the brief-writing process, or to suggest that this memo was sent to 
McCree before the brief was filed. 
187. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 32; O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 185; 
Osborne, supra note 114. 
188. CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 240. 
189. See id. 
190. See generally CALIFANO, supra note 36, at 241; O'NEILL, supra note 114, at 185-
86; Osborne, supra note 114. 
191. CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 45. 
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Bakke represented a valiant effort by Bell to protect the independence of 
the SG's office. Ultimately, however, it was a failed effort. Most accounts of 
the episode conclude that the White House directed significant pressure at the 
SG in the brief-writing process,192 and that the administration had proven 
powerfully unsympathetic to the traditional independence of the SG' s office. 193 
Even if the bulk of the intrusion was deflected from McCree, the White 
House's actions were weighty precedent. Even if the degree of intrusion was 
not as large as everyone thought, precedents are based on perceptions of facts, 
not facts in their pure form. Even the Supreme Court expressed its displeasure; 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun complained to McCree about leaks 
of the government's briefs to the press, purportedly saying that "the entire 
court was offended and displeased.,,194 They were less concerned with the 
independence of the SG's office, it seems, than with the "improper public 
pressure" that such a media circus put on the Court. 195 
But people learn from mistakes. Bell continued to maintain that he and 
the President had not contributed a single word to the brief,l96 and he came 
away from the Bakke debacle with a better understanding of his task as AG to 
keep the Justice Department and the SG's office independent. 197 Furthermore, 
reaction to the episode, together with the Hill incident, engendered a strong 
statement of SG independence, the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum 
discussed next. 
192. See, e.g., DREYFUSS & LAWRENCE, supra note 114, at 170; 0 'NEILL, supra note 
114, at 186-87; SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 46. My own opinion largely parallels Drew 
Days', namely that the final content of the brief was not much affected by this political input. 
Days does, however, "attest to the general accuracy of published accounts of presidential 
involvement in that event." Drew S. Days, 111, In Search of the Solicitor Genera/'s Clients: A 
Drama with Many Characters, 83 Ky. L.J. 485, 490 (1995). 
193. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, For the Us.: Griffin Bell, Esq., WASH. POST, July I, 
1979 (Magazine), at 10 (quoting "upper-level White House aide" as saying "The White House 
should have a role in determining what briefs the solicitor general files ... , To say, for 
example, that the White House shouldn't get involved in the Bakke case, as Bell originally did, 
is just crazy! "). 
194. Osborne, supra note 114, at 15. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. Surely this is an exaggeration, given that even Days admits the White House 
changed the word "race-conscious." See supra text accompanying note 181. 
197. See CAPLAN, supra note 63, at 45. 
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d. Law Versus Policy 
In recounting his error in bringing his draft brief to the White House, Bell 
wrote: 
Nowhere is the tug of war between the White House and a Cabinet Department more 
apparent than in a dispute between the Justice Department and the President's staff 
over what is law and what is policy. If the staff had its way, no doubt every major 
issue that naturally fell to the Justice Department would be considered policy rather 
than a legal matter. Then the White House would be making all the decisions, because 
it is the White House where policy is made. 198 
The year after Bakke, in a press conference, Bell reflected on the case: 
[W]e had a time about the Bakke brief. There was nothing improper about that. I've 
thought about the Bakke case for a long time. That was a case oflaw and policy. The 
President's got a policy where he wants to uphold affirmative action, and the President 
had very little to say about the Bakke brief. 199 
In response to the Hill incident earlier in the year, the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) had begun preparing a statement on the bounds of the 
institutional relationship between the AG and SG, and more broadly, on the 
independence of the Solicitor General and his role in separating matters oflaw 
from matters of policy. The Bakke case made the memo even more timely, 
perhaps even urgent. When OLC attorney John Harmon, who signed the 
memo, presented it to McCree, he added in a note, "I would very much 
appreciate your reactions and suggestions. I felt this was a memorandum that 
you might be in a difficult position to write, but a memorandum which needed 
writing:'Z(){) Harmon was right that the memo had to come from the OLC, not 
the SG, in order to have legitimacy. 
The memorandum's main points, for our purposes, were that: (1) the SG 
has a tradition of being given independence in formulating legal judgments, 
both within the Justice Department and the Executive Branch as a whole; (2) 
this independence serves important pragmatic purposes; (3) the AG's role, as 
both a policy and legal advisor to the President, increases the need for an 
independent SG; and (4) the best way to make sure that the boundaries between 
law and policy are defined appropriately is to have the SG, not the 
policymakers, perform that task.201 It is quite clear that from the institutional 
198. BELL & OSTROW, supra note 36, at 30. 
199. Griffin Bell, Press Conference (Aug. 3, 1978) (McCree Papers, Box 2). 
200. Note from John Harmon to Wade McCree (Sept. 29, 1977) (McCree Papers, Box 
25-14). 
20 I. See lOp. Off. Legal Counsel 228 (1977), reprinted in 21 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1089 
( 1988). 
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standpoint of the Office of the Solicitor General, this official policy statement 
was the most significant development of McCree's tenure. It is unsurprising 
that this strong statement of the SG's independence, and of the AG's role in 
maintaining it, came from Bell's Justice Department. Bell had worked hard, 
if not always successfully, to insulate McCree, and this memo helped nail 
down the precedential and policy basis for doing so. 
The law and policy distinction is a crucial one, and the OLC memo 
provided a strong basis for a sustainable policy ofhandling it in the long term. 
Years later, McCree said that he had consulted with Bell on Bakke, but only to 
the extent that there were policy issues involved. Using familiar words, he 
praised Bell for "recogniz[ing] that the independent legal decision-making 
status of the Solicitor General will be preserved if it is the Solicitor General 
who normally decides when to seek the advice of the Attorney General or the 
President in a given case, not the other way around.,,202 
If a Supreme Court case can ever be as much about policy as law, Bakke 
was just that. Perhaps if a more diplomatic Assistant SG than Frank 
Easterbrook had written the SG's first draft brief, there would not have been 
nearly as much controversy. It seems, however, that there was no way to 
satisfy everyone from a policy standpoint. If the brief-writing process had 
been more private and only the finished product had been made available to the 
press and pressure groups, there almost certainly would still have been 
controversy. There is probably no good way to write briefs that simultaneously 
play well to politicians and the Supreme Court. It is clear that the SG's 
audience is the Court, and it is equally clear that Wade McCree understood 
this, even if that meant being criticized and pressured. 
3. Massachusetts v. Feeney 
a. Introduction 
The next case that sheds light on McCree's tenure as SG is Massachusetts 
v. Feeney.203 In Feeney, a female applicant for a Massachusetts civil service 
position sued the State.204 She claimed that the State's veterans' preference 
system, under which non-veterans could get a job only after all qualified 
veterans were hired, was unconstitutionally discriminatory against women.20S 
A three-judge district court agreed, finding the program discriminatory because 
202. Notes from Lecture by McCree at LSU Law Center (Feb. 28, 1979) (McCree 
Papers, Box 65-70). 
203. 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
204. See id. at 259. 
205. See id. 
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of its disparate impact.206 The Supreme Court remanded in light of Washington 
v. Davis,207 a case that required a showing of intent to discriminate rather than 
mere disparate impact.208 The district court reaffirmed its ruling, holding that 
the disparity of impact of the Massachusetts program was too obvious and 
inevitable to be unintended.209 
b. Defining the Government's Interest as Amicus 
The case initially seemed to follow a normal path.2lO The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari on October 10, 1978. The federal government had a clear 
interest in the case, since it administered a huge veterans' preference program 
of its own. McCree met with the various concerned agencies, which were split 
over which position to endorse. The Labor Department and the Civil Service 
Commission did not want McCree to file any brief, particularly not one in 
favor of the Massachusetts program. The Civil and Civil Rights Divisions of 
the Justice Department were unenthusiastic about defending the preferences, 
but did not object to a filing. The Veterans Administration supported filing a 
brief defending veterans' preferences. McCree decided to file a brief, to be 
written by now-Deputy SG Frank Easterbrook, that reflected the input of the 
concerned agencies.211 
The reason for the split within the administration was that, as part of his 
plans for civil service reform, President Carter had proposed eliminating much 
of the federal veterans' preference program, in large part because of its 
disparate impact on women.212 The brief supported veterans' preferences in 
general, but not the Massachusetts plan in particular, and noted (and mooted) 
this political backdrop: 
[T]he President wishes to modify the existing federal preference system .... We do 
not address policy issues here except to note the reasons why, in our view, the federal 
206. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976). 
207. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
208. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 280-81, Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977); 
Washington, 426 U.S. at 229. 
209. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D. Mass. 1978). 
210. See generally Neil Pickett, McCree Brie/Seen Highlighting Policy Split, NAT'L LJ., 
Dec. 18, 1978; Kathy Sawyer, Justice Backs Veterans' Job Law: White House Aides Upset, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1978, at A2 [hereinafter Sawyer I]; Kathy Sawyer, Carter Still Upset by 
Veterans' Rule, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1978, at A39 [hereinafter Sawyer II]; McCree Papers. 
211. See Pickett, supra note 210. 
212. At that time, the nation's veterans were 98 percent male. See Sawyer I, supra note 
210, atA2. 
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veterans' preference is a rational and constitutionally permissible response to 
legitimate governmental concerns.213 
In other words, consistent with the Hannon memo, the SG's office had 
determined that this case was a matter of law, not policy, and as such it did not 
need to concern itself with the fact that Carter wanted, ideally, to eliminate the 
issue altogether. As Easterbrook put it in a newspaper report on the case, the 
brief did not argue that the President and Congress should not change the 
preference system, it argued that the Court should not change it, because the 
program was constitutionally pennissible.214 While the brief steered clear of 
"endorsing" the Massachusetts or federal programs,215 it did read the intent 
standard of Davis differently than the lower court had, and argued that "it is 
clear that the Massachusetts veterans' preference was intended to achieve 
legitimate objectives and not to discriminate against women.,,216 
The subtlety of Easterbrook's distinctions were lost on the agencies and 
women's groups who reacted angrily to the brief after its filing on December 
4. Some felt that the brief should have staked out a narrower position, 
supporting the federal government's programs (which gave extra points to 
veterans in an elaborate civil service process) while affinnatively opposing the 
more extreme Massachusetts program (which gave jobs to non-veterans only 
after all veterans applying had been hired). Others apparently felt that neither 
program should be supported. 
For our purposes, though, the most significant complaint was that McCree 
had taken a position that contradicted the President's. Judith Lichtman of the 
Women's Legal Defense Fund, for instance, said that it was "absurd to have 
these people in the solicitor general's office taking a position opposite to that 
of the president. ,,217 Lichtman accused the SG' s office of going "off on its own 
initiative to make policy[.]"2Is The Washington Post reported that "[s]ome 
sources suggested the solicitor general's office is developing a 'history of 
differing with the administration position,'''219 and cited the Hill and Bakke 
cases as examples. In the same story, Easterbrook downplayed such 
disagreements as "'happen[ing] all the time,' as part of standard operating 
213. Briefforthe United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Massachussetts v. Feeney, 442 
U. S. 256 (1979), in 110 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL, 1978 Term Supplement, at 491 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 
1980) [hereinafter Feeney Brief]. 
214. See Sawyer II, supra note 210, at A39. 
215. See Feeney Brief, supra note 213, at 491. 
216. Id. at 490. 
217. Sawyer I, supra note 210, at A2 (internal quotes omitted). 
218. Pickett, supra note 210 (internal quotes omitted). 
219. Sawyer I, supra note 210, at A2. 
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procedures.'>220 Easterbrook was no doubt miscited for that proposition; he was 
probably referring to the fact that standard procedure allowed groups of 
varying opinions to provide input and criticism, not that it was standard 
procedure to disagree with the White House.221 
For its part, the White House seemed aware of the law/policy distinction 
and was only actually concerned with the lack of communication between the 
SG and the White House. This relatively understanding position took some 
time to emerge; early reports indicated that Carter was "angry" and critical of 
Easterbrook's brief,222 and an unnamed "administration official,,223 was 
reported as saying that "[t]here is a degree of independence in [the SG's office] 
that is of concern among White House aides[.]"224 Soon, however, Carter 
reported that he was only concerned that the brief would be "misinterpreted" 
as a change in the administration's position, and that Bell had advised him that 
the brief did not actually conflict with his opposition to veterans' 
preferences.225 
The biggest problem that the White House seemed to have was that it had 
been caught unaware of the briefs contents when it was filed. Bell responded 
by asking McCree to give Bell "the same notice he gives to other agencies 
when requesting comments on any legal action,,226 at which point Bell would 
"bear the responsibility for any communication with the White House."227 It 
is unclear if this lack of communication reflected the insulation of the SG's 
office or the disorganization of the Carter White House. Bell's request did not 
represent new policy; McCree had always made a point of communicating with 
the AG's office.228 It is more likely that Bell just wanted to make a statement 
for appearance's sake, or at most that he wanted the SG's office to do a better 
job of highlighting important cases. For whatever reason, there were no more 
incidents like Hill, Bakke, or Feeney for the rest of McCree's tenure. Whether 
220. Id. 
221. Elsewhere in the same article, Easterbrook made another comment, which did not 
have to be misused to be inflammatory, and which certainly had less subtlety than his law/policy 
distinction. He said, '" I assume the President could have instructed us not to file the brief ... 
However, he noted also that one of the articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon 
contained the argument that the president was 'trying to tell the Justice Department what to 
do.'" Id. 
222. See Angry President Seeks Review on Vets' Status, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1978, at 
A16 (McCree Papers, Box 33-5). 
223. See Sawyer II, supra note 210, at A39. 
224. Id. 
225. See id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id.; see also O'Connor, supra note 84, at 261 (internal quotes omitted). 
228. See 1977 Ninth Circuit Address, supra note 30, at 552. 
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this was because of better communication or a lack of controversial cases is 
unclear, but to the extent that an SG's job involves staying out oftrouble and 
out of the newspaper, McCree performed well in his last three years. 
Additionally, another important thing was clear: the administration had 
learned its lesson from Bakke. Despite the quotation from the administration 
official concerned about the independence of the SG's office, "[o]fficials at 
both the White House and the Justice Department emphasized [to the media] 
their desire to 'insulate' the solicitor general's office from undue political 
influence.,,229 The problem was one of coordinating public relations; there 
seemed to be no question that the SG' s office would have the last word on this 
matter of law.230 
c. Centralization of Authority 
The story of Feeney was not over, however. The pressure remained on 
McCree to soften his position. How he dealt with it gives us a glimpse into the 
way in which the SG must deal with competing desires from various agencies. 
As we will see, Feeney is an atypical case, both because of the sort of pressure 
put on McCree and the end result, the filing of a separate brief. Nevertheless, 
by showing us the limits of the centralization of authority under the SG, we can 
better understand the normal cases, in which McCree did allow himself to have 
the last word. 
As usual for a controversial case, dozens of letters and telegrams flooded 
Carter and Bell's offices, almost all urging them to intervene and overrule 
McCree. Privately, however, a more plausible and constructive effort was 
being made to adjust the SG's position. Eleanor Holmes Norton, chair of the 
EEOC and a respected colleague of McCree's, wrote him a confidential, 
personal letter. In it, she said that she was considering asking for a separate 
government brief to be filed, but that she did not want to publicly oppose the 
SG. She suggested that McCree file a reply brief narrowing and toning down 
the government's support of veterans' preference programs and distinguishing 
them from the Massachusetts program: 
229. Sawyer II, supra note 210, at A39. 
230. An interesting postscript comes in the form of a letter written to Bell from a veteran 
who was angry with what he perceived as the pressure being brought to bear on McCree to 
change his position. Letter from Leonard W. Pipkin to Griffin Bell (Feb. 3, 1979) (McCree 
Papers, Box 33-5). While it is likely that Pipkin was more concerned about veterans' 
preferences than about the independence of the SG's office, the broad, arguably defensive 
response by Bell's assistant is telling. He wrote: "I assure you that no pressure has been exerted 
on the Solicitor General by the Attorney General over the question of veterans' preferences or 
any other question." Letter from 1. Phillip Jordan to Pipkin (Feb. 27, 1979) (McCree Papers, 
Box 33-5). 
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[Women's groups] justifiably feel that the brief of the United States is in tone an 
advocate's brief for Massachusetts (contrary, as I understand it, to the consensus 
reached at the meeting of the various concerned agencies) .... We strenuously urge 
this position as a reasonable accommodation that takes into account the interests of all 
concerned in a way that does not embarrass any of us. Above all we have tried to be 
sensitive to your special position.231 
McCree wrote back to say that he agreed with Norton on the need to 
protect simultaneously the current legislation, the President's proposals, and 
the government's civil rights program. He said that he would wait for the 
appellee's response before deciding on his course of action. 
McCree also included, on a confidential basis, Deputy SG Easterbrook's 
Dec. 8 analysis of a memorandum that criticized the SG's brief. The 
memorandum had been written by women's rights advocates Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Phyllis Segal, and had been sent to AG Bell at his invitation.232 
In his analysis, Easterbrook deflected some of the more technical criticisms, 
and contended that "[t]he principal argument ofthe memorandum ... is that 
the brief reads as if it had been written by an advocate. . .. [This is] not a 
legitimate ground of criticism. We should be advocates for the constitutional 
power of Congress and the President."233 
The Easterbrook memo provoked an unhappy response by Norton. She 
wrote back to McCree, complaining that the memo 
resurrects the controversy in the worst way, and should it become a basis for judging 
whether to file a reply brief, will almost certainly lead to another public flare-up over 
this issue. . .. I found [Easterbrook's] comments to the press on the role of the 
Administration in this case inflammatory and unprofessional and I must tell you that 
this view is widely shared.234 
She continued, explaining that she had personally been containing media flare-
ups: 
[T]his matter is under control only because of the most extensive efforts on my 
part. . .. [The EEOC, Civil Service Commission, and Labor Department] were 
prepared to formally petition you to file a separate brief. However, this course of 
action guaranteed further open controversy and needless criticism ofyou.235 
231. Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton to Wade McCree (Dec. 21,1978) (McCree 
Papers, Box 33-5). 
232. See Sawyer II, supra note 210, at A39. Interestingly, Ginsburg, then on the faculty 
of Columbia Law School, had been a finalist for the post ofSG but lost out to McCree. See AI 
Kamen, An IncreaSingly Crowded Legal Ring, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,1992, at A19. 
233. Memorandum from Deputy Solicitor General Frank Easterbrook (Dec. 8, 1978) 
(McCree Papers, Box 33-5). 
234. Letter from Eleanor Holmes Norton to Wade McCree (Jan. 5, 1979). 
235. Jd. 
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Her suggestion of a strategic SG reply brief was kept from the women's 
groups, and Norton used the "strength of her reputation,,236 to reassure the 
women's groups that she would "find a satisfactory solution,,237 with McCree, 
and to keep the groups from speaking out further in the press. 
Three weeks later, apparently still not satisfied with McCree's response, 
Norton sent a suggested reply brief. McCree had three options at this point. 
He could give in to Norton and file a strategically worded reply/supplemental 
brief narrowing the government's argument; he could allow Norton to file her 
own brief, an option he considered to be a "last resort,,,238 or he could do 
neither. For all intents and purposes, the decision was McCree's to make. 
There were several factors to balance. First, the law. We may surmise 
that McCree knew better than Norton, Bell, or Carter's staff what the Court 
was likely to do in the case. It was his job to know better. His confidence in 
Easterbrook reflected in part this legal judgment. On the other hand, the 
Massachusetts plan was extreme; why go out on a limb to defend it when the 
interest of the United States could be served by defending the federal program 
and ignoring Massachusetts'? Easterbrook had written, referring to his brief: 
"It is my hope that the first 1 0 pages of the argument section of the brief will 
show the Court how it can reverse without doing any damage to our civil rights 
programs.,,239 But Ginsburg and Norton did not read his brief that way, and the 
Court had reason to not read it that way either, as shown by the other excerpts 
from Easterbrook's brief reproduced above. 
Second, even if McCree's legal judgment was not superior to that of his 
critics, it was important for appearance's sake-for his credibility with the 
Court, and for morale in the SG' s office-to maintain consistency and stick with 
his first argument. The Court's displeasure with the bifurcated brief in the Hill 
case made this clear, and McCree was well aware of this. Toward the end of 
his tenure, he wrote: "The Supreme Court normally expects us to reconci Ie the 
disparate views of the government and to speak with one voice. That is, after 
all, why we have a Solicitor General.,,240 
Consideration of appearances on the other side broke down into either the 
political considerations that any SG would prefer to avoid, or the public-
relations issues that, while troublesome, would be fixed by better 
communication, not by loosening the SG's reins on centralized appellate 
authority. If McCree gave into this pressure, it would only get worse, as 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. McCree, supra note 65, at 346. 
239. Memorandum from Frank Easterbrook, supra note 233. 
240. McCree, supra note 65, at 346. 
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emboldened agencies realized that if they fought hard enough, they could have 
the last word instead of the SO. 
As mentioned above, this episode was atypical. In most cases, according 
to McCree, the SO's office followed a process with a 
long tradition[,] . . . a process of sorting and sifting, listening and debating, 
compromising and holding firm-but always discussing. . .. [W]hen the discussion 
process is over and well-grounded differences of opinion on the merits of a legal issue 
remain, the Solicitor General will attempt to convey both points of view to the Court. 
This may be done by filing a brief that sets forth both points of view, or, very rarely, 
by permitting an agency to file a brief or petition of its own that is authorized by the 
Solicitor General but not endorsed by him. This, I should stress, is a measure of last 
resort.241 
This typical, traditional process fit well with McCree's collegial manner, 
and if it did not always leave every party satisfied, it at least seemed to 
minimize the inevitable alienation that always comes from choosing one side 
over another.242 Some of that conflict is also spawned by an unavoidable part 
of the SO'sjob-taking legal positions that have unpopular substantive effects. 
While there were solid legal arguments opposing the SO in the Hill, Bakke, and 
Feeney disagreements, the bulk of the pressure directed at the SO's office 
seems to have been based on policy predilections or, at best, legal realism. 
Drew Days remembers that, when working out the position of the United 
States, McCree would patiently hear out conferees arguing for policy 
outcomes. When they were done, he would ask, politely but pointedly, if they 
had any legal arguments to offer.243 
In Feeney, for reasons that are not wholly clear, McCree allowed the 
dissenting agencies to file their own brief. Perhaps he felt that a separate brief 
would allow the SO to make its own, undiluted argument, something it had not 
been able to do in Hill. Perhaps he was sympathetic to Norton's position 
because he did not see the law as being as clear cut as Easterbrook had 
represented it. Whatever his reasons, McCree allowed the general counsels of 
the Office of Personnel Management, Department of Defense, and the EEOC, 
and the Solicitor of Labor (all of whom, coincidentally, were women) to file 
a brief on February 9, 1979. The brief was neutral on the constitutional ity of 
the Massachusetts statute, and suggested differences between the 
241. Jd. at 345-46. 
242. The Reagan Administration, by contrast, was more likely to have a centralized legal 
argument and to shut out the disagreeing agency's viewpoint. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and 
Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 
255,285-86 (1994). 
243. See Comments from Drew Days, supra note 108. 
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Massachusetts and federal programs, differences which would allow the Court 
to preserve the latter while enjoining the former. 
In the event, the Supreme Court upheld the Massachusetts statute despite 
its harshly disparate impact. The Court supported the more conservative view 
of the intent standard favored by McCree and Easterbrook, not the more liberal 
one propounded by the district court and Norton. 
4. Serving the Client-Haig v. Agee, Bell v. Wolfish, Cooper v. 
Califano 
Three relatively minor cases highlight the way in which being SG entailed 
serving a client-the government-in ways that, if not uncomfortable for 
McCree, at least required some adjustment from his former role as a judge. 
a. Haig v. Agee 
In many types of cases, SGs have the luxury of a quasi-judicial approach 
to the law, trying to figure out the direction of the Court and going with the 
flow. In national security cases, by contrast, SGs generally represent their 
client very vigorously, and press the Court to extend the government's powers 
as far they will go. An example of such a case is Haig v. Agee.244 
In Haig, the State Department wanted to revoke the passport of Philip 
Agee, an ex-CIA agent who had gone abroad in a campaign to blow the cover 
of CIA officers and agents around the world.245 Agee was causing serious 
damage to national security, but the district and circuit courts held that the 
Secretary of State had exceeded his statutory authority.246 It is unclear what 
McCree, known for his commitment to individual rights over government 
infringement, would have held as ajudge. As SG, however, he pressed for as 
broad an interpretation of the Secretary's power as possible, a position that 
disturbed some legal commentators.247 
In one sense it was an easy call for McCree, since Agee was causing 
substantial damage to national security. On the other hand, the lower courts 
and two dissenters on the Supreme Court had had no trouble finding in Agee's 
favor. In dissent, Justice Brennan quoted the expansive view of executive 
power for which McCree contended at oral argument: 
244. 453 U.S. 280 (1981) 
245. See id. at 280. 
246. See id. at 287-88. 
247. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Editorial, The Agee Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,1981, 
at AI5 (expressing "concem[] about the potential reach" of the Secretary of State's power). 
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An excerpt from the petitioner's portion of the oral argument is particularly revealing: 
"QUESTION: General McCree, supposing a person right now were to apply for 
a passport to go to Salvador, and when asked the purpose of his journey, to say, to 
denounce the United States policy in Salvador in supporting the junta. And the 
Secretary of State says, I just will not issue a passport for that purpose. Do you think 
that he can consistently do that in the light of our previous cases? 
"MR. McCREE: I would say, yes, he can. Because we have to vest these-The 
President of the United States and the Secretary of State working under him are 
charged with conducting the foreign policy of the Nation, and the freedom of speech 
that we enjoy domestically may be different from that that we can exercise in this 
context." Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. The reach of the Secretary's discretion is potentially 
staggering.w 
McCree thus seemed to have adapted readily to his role as an advocate.249 
b. Bell v. Wolfish 
Perhaps the most striking example of a case that McCree probably would 
have treated differently as a judge than as SG is Bell v. Wolfish. 250 In Wolfish, 
McCree was called on to defend the government against a suit by pre-trial 
detainees, who claimed that the conditions of their confinement violated the 
presumption of innocence and the Fourth Amendment.251 McCree disagreed, 
and the Court upheld the practices, which included prohibiting receipt of 
packages of food and personal items, and conducting visual body-cavity 
searches of inmates following contact visits. It is impossible to say for sure 
what McCree's take on such a case would have been as ajudge, but his anti-
rights argument in this case does contrast with the pro-rights record he had 
built before becoming the government's legal spokesman. 
c. Cooper v. Califano 
Congress is also a client of the Solicitor General, who will generally fight 
to affirm the constitutionality of congressional enactments, all other things 
being equal. McCree called the decision not to defend a duly enacted law, or 
to contest the constitutionality of a statute as an amicus, "[p ]erhaps the most 
248. Haig, 453 U.S. at 319 n.9 (Brennan, 1., dissenting). 
249. Another, similar example is Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). In that case, 
McCree argued that the exclusion of women from draft registration was constitutional, mainly 
because of the deference due to the government in military matters. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 
69. This case is mentioned here because it was one of the major ones of McCree's tenure, but 
it does not shed additional light on the conduct of the SG's office. 
250. 441 U.S. 520 (I 979). 
251. See id. 
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sensitive decision for a Solicitor General."m An example of such a decision 
was Cooper v. Califano.253 In that case, the district court enjoined the 
discriminatory distribution, under the Social Security Act, of certain benefits 
to female spouses but not male ones. Since the Supreme Court had just 
decided in Weinberger v. Wiesenfekf-54 that such discrimination in the Social 
Security Act violated the Fifth Amendment, McCree decided not to appeal 
Cooper.255 
The reason that this entailed an adjustment for McCree from his role as 
judge is not that he had been free to ignore Supreme Court precedent as a 
circuit court judge. The opposite is true; what was a "most sensitive 
decision,,256 for McCree as SG would have been the simplest possible for 
McCree as a judge. 
5. Independent Agency Litigation 
There were no cases during McCree's tenure that provide any exceptional 
insight on the relation between the SG and independent agencies. The 
statistics discussed above showed that, in general, McCree was more likely 
than most SGs to allow independent agencies to argue their own cases and to 
defer to their interpretations of the law.257 We have also seen, however, that 
McCree was similarly generous in allowing other, non-independent 
government lawyers to argue cases.258 Whatever one makes of these statistics, 
it seems that relations with independent agencies were harmonious during 
McCree's tenure, and that there were no major departures from the long-term 
trends regarding independent agencies and the SG's office. 
It was Bell the political actor, not McCree, who was charged with 
protecting the centralized litigatory authority of the SG's office, and Bell 
generally did a good job. During Bell's first nine months as AG, there were 
six instances in which, after the SG's office refused to pursue an independent 
agency's case, Congress began attempts to intervene. All six were foiled by 
Bell and administration ally Senator Eastland of Mississippi.259 
252. McCree, supra note 65, at 343. 
253. 81 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1978). 
254. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
255. See McCree, supra note 65, at 344. 
256. Id. at 343. 
257. See sllpra Section II I. C. 
258. See sllpra text accompanying note 83. 
259. See Judith Miller, Agencies Fight Plan to Merge Legal Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
1977, at 27. 
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6. Confession of Error 
As with independent litigating authority, there were no major shifts 
regarding policy in confession of error during McCree's tenure. Other than 
one typical application of the Petite policy,260 there were two cases that shed 
minor light on the bounds of the practice. In Thompson v. United States,261 the 
government refused to confess error at the circuit court level, but reversed 
itself at the Supreme Court. As such, though the SG wanted the Court to 
remand the case all the way down to the district court with instructions to 
dismiss the charges, the Court refused and instead remanded to the circuit court 
for reconsideration in light of the government's new position.262 
A strategic use of the confession technique came in EPA v. Brown,263 in 
which the SG confessed error by saying that a case was moot because the 
government was going to change the regulations at issue. The SG's office 
apparently did this to avoid an adverse ruling by the Supreme Court, and to 
have the adverse rulings in the circuit courts vacated.264 Whatever the SG's 
intentions, however, the Court was willing to go along. 
For his part, McCree offered a conventional view of confession of error. 
He reminisced that as a circuit court judge, his only reason to pay attention to 
the SG had been when it confessed error, which it did in two of his cases. 
McCree joked that he liked the practice in the case in which he was in dissent, 
but was less happy with it in the other case, for which he had written a 
unanimous opinion.265 Elsewhere, he wrote (in a typically conciliatory vein) 
that the decision to confess error "requires much soul-searching and is to be 
rendered as a last resort .... The United States Attorney, who has tried the 
case[,] ... understandably takes a dim view of confessions of error [,] ... [and 
the practice] generate[s] tensions with lower court judges .... "266 
7. The Billy Carter Case-Other Administrative Duties 
One other duty of the SG is to act as the "honest broker" in the Justice 
Department. While the Justice Department is supposed to maintain a certain 
260. See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam) (applying policy from 
Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529,530 (1960), under which valid but duplicative federal 
conviction is voluntarily withdrawn on appeal). 
261. 444 U.S. 248, 250 (1980) (per curiam). 
262. See id. 
263. 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam). 
264. See David M. Rosenzweig, Note, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the 
Solicitor General, 82 GEO. LJ. 2079, 2099 (1994) (quoting Brown, 431 U.S. at (04). 
265. See 1977 Ninth Circuit Address, supra note 30, at 548. 
266. McCree, supra note 65, at 342-43. 
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level of independence, most of its high-ranking officials are political 
appointees. The Solicitor General is a political appointee too, to be sure, but 
his traditional position of independence puts him in a unique position to lend 
credibility to the findings of internal investigations. 
The most prominent example of this during McCree's tenure was the Billy 
Carter case.267 Carter, the President's brother, had registered as an agent for 
the Libyan government. It was alleged that President Carter and AG Civiletti 
(Bell's successor) had interfered with the Justice Department investigation of 
Billy Carter. Civiletti had discussed the case with the President, but denied 
doing so later. The Justice Department investigators concluded, however, that 
the discussion had not been inappropriate and was consistent with the AG's 
duty to keep the President informed on such matters. The whole matter had 
caused an uproar, but the investigation cleared the President and Attorney 
General of wrongdoing. The final report was submitted to McCree, who 
approved it. 
It is a striking declaration of the respect for the independence of the SG' s 
office that a political appointee, the third-ranking official in the department, 
could put such a controversial matter to rest by accepting an internal report.268 
CONCLUSION 
Wade McCree was an effective Solicitor General. The cases he handled 
provide good examples of the traditional conduct of the SG's office. Although 
the long-standing independence of the SG was attacked by elements of the 
Carter administration, McCree and AG Bell successfully withstood the 
pressure. McCree's judicial temperament and keen intellect served him well 
in his post, and he truly exemplified the highest standards of the office. 
267. This account of the case is taken from Robert Pear, Us. Aides Cleared in Billy 
Carter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1981, at AI. 
268. Another instance of McCree giving final approval to an internal investigation is his 
handling of the Marston affair, in which Carter and Bell were cleared of obstructing justice in 
the removal of Philadelphia U.S. Attorney Daniel Marston. See Questions Still Linger in the 
Marston Affair, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 6, 1978, at 22 (noting that political and 
credibility problems remained for Carter even if the investigation ended his legal ones). 
